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Abstract 
 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the leadership role member states – in particular 
France – play in implementing the European Union`s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy with military crisis management missions in Africa. To that end, the research 
conducted in this thesis is placed within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalist 
(LI) theory. LI presupposes the centrality of the nation state in the European integration 
project, allowing for a closer analysis of the development of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, and of the member states interests and motivations in the process, 
coupled with the limitations the system places on possible outcomes, with a focus on 
France. This is then placed in the integral context of the EU military missions to Africa, 
starting with Operation Artemis to the Democratic Republic of Congo, followed by 
EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR and Operation Atalanta/EU NAVFOR, with a brief 
overview of two non-missions that were under consideration. The thesis argues that EU 
military interventions in Africa are primarily done at the leadership of France, with the 
necessity of unanimity and compromise in a heterogeneous, ambiguous framework 
together with a need for political will and resource allocation from member states 
severely limits mission mandates as well as gives them a secondary rationale beyond 
humanitarian considerations. 
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Introduction  
 
Although the European integration project had, to a small degree of intensity, tried to 
incorporate foreign and security policy issues into the construct from the onset, the end 
of the Cold War and the outbreak of war in Kosovo played an instrumental role in the 
establishment of an international security character for the European Union. 
Concurrently with instability in its neighbourhood, in the rest of the world there was an 
upsurge in violent intrastate and inter-state conflict, and failing or failed states. Thus, 
during the 1990´s the EU faced several challenges, leading to the re-evaluation of its 
conflict management capabilities and policies. Since as a collective, the EU carries 
international weight primarily in the spheres of soft power (form trade to environmental 
policy) but in order to act more forcefully and in accordance with expectations and 
changes in the international system, an autonomous hard power capacity was found 
pertinent. As a result, the ´common European policy on security and defence` was 
officially launched at the Cologne Summit in 1999 as the ´European Security and 
Defence Policy` (ESDP), and with the Lisbon Treaty (entering into force in 2009) 
transformed into the ´Common Security and Defence Policy` (CSDP) (Bickerton et al. 
2011). Its objectives are broadly two-fold: internal institutional development to allow 
for coherence, cooperation and thus a greater role in international security issues; and to 
give the EU practical autonomous means to intervene in conflict situations with military 
means if necessary (ibid.). 
The mandate, resources and structure of ESDP/CSDP have been contested from the 
onset; the main cleavages pertaining to the civilian orientation of the EU, the relations 
with and the role of NATO, budgetary concerns, and the disparate strategic cultures, 
views and interests hindering political cohesion. Since member states have kept control 
of their national foreign and defence policies, the ESDP/CSDP and its conflict 
management policy has remained rooted in intergovernmentalism, with decisions made 
in the European Council and dependent on nation state´s political will and resource 
allocation. This allows states and in particular their interests to assert strong impact on 
common European policies; resulting in an ambiguous policy, whose implementation is 
conditioned on interest-based negotiations to find points of congruence in a system of 
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unanimity, influenced by domestic considerations about the use of force in military 
missions abroad. In spite of the problems and disagreements, since 2003 when ESDP 
became functional, the EU has undertaken around 30 civilian operations out of which 
six have been military missions, predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout the 
process, France in particular has been instrumental in shaping the policy and in its 
implementation. Deriving from its philosophical outlook, past experiences and decline 
in global power, France has been the most consistent engineer of the policy, advocate 
for enhanced cooperation and collective capacity bolstering, and been the main architect 
of the EU missions. 
The salience and relevance of this thesis topic arises from the EU launching a new 
military mission in 2014 to Central African Republic at the insistence of France after a 
six year period where no new military missions were authorized. In order to understand 
the absence (there has not been an absence of crises e.g. Mali, South Sudan, Libya), the 
reluctance and future prospects for EU military missions, there is a need to understand 
what propels - under which considerations and in what context - the EU member states 
as a collective entity to act. Previous research has focused on single missions, on giving 
an overview on select missions or on mission outcomes and evaluation (Germond & 
Smith2009; Knutsen 2009; Major 2009; Dijkstra 2010; Styan 2012; Pohl 2013b). There 
has not been comprehensive investigation with an intergovernmentalist approach 
focusing only on the drivers behind the military missions in Africa. Separating African 
and other missions is pertinent due to the character of the operating theatre; being a 
region where a number of member states have no immediate defence interests, there are 
other international security organizations present and the EU can alternatively utilize a 
mixture of its civilian crisis management tools and development funds.  
Therefore in the light of the politico-institutional structure on the one hand and the 
leadership position France has taken in both driving and operationalizing the policy, the 
purpose of this case study is to examine the rationale behind EU`s military interventions 
and the shape those missions have taken in African crises. With the aim of investigating 
the role a lead member state has played in both developing the EU as an international 
security actor and in forming the EU`s military missions in Africa. In elaborating the 
role France has played in designing the CSDP, its continued interests in Africa and the 
patterns present in previous missions, this thesis aims to illustrate the importance of 
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member state leadership operating in a suitable context as necessary preconditions for 
the EU to be a military actor.  
To this end, the study seeks to answer two main research questions – Why has the EU, 
operating autonomously, intervened militarily in particular cases in Africa? Have the 
interventions been shaped and formed primarily by the interests and at the insistence of 
a single member state? – And a range of narrower questions – What factors have driven 
the development of EU as an international security actor?  Why have the states endowed 
the EU with military capabilities? Why has France taken the leadership position? Have 
the missions in Africa been undertaken as a response to external threats to European 
security, have they been motivated by humanitarian concerns or have they served other 
policy objectives? What explains the national participation of member states in different 
missions? 
From the methodological and conceptual perspective the analysis of EU military 
missions in Africa serves as an illustrative case study (descriptive in nature, enables to 
show why the CSDP is driven by member state interests, with the bigger states taking 
the lead, by introducing the considerations surrounding mission authorization, mandate, 
force content) based on the liberal intergovernmentalist theory. The data in use relies 
primarily on secondary sources – academic articles and books – and was supplemented 
by reports of international organizations, state agencies and foreign policy research 
groups; and by the theoretical work on liberal intergovernmentalism done by Andrew 
Moravcsik. The data collection criteria depended largely on existing and obtainable 
material, with a linguistic limitation, since I cannot speak French. Principally, I chose 
material that reflected neutrally the situations and actors in question and presented 
necessary data to characterize different aspects of state involvement, French leadership 
and cooperation in the EU. The focus of the thesis is on military or armed crisis 
management missions, thus civilian crisis management initiatives, such as police or 
military training missions together with policy developments and initiatives launched 
and administered by the European Commission are not scrutinized. 
The first chapter elucidates the theoretical basis for understanding state cooperation in 
the field of security and defence, by clarifying liberal intergovernmentalism and 
therefore the different facets of state motivations for integration. The second chapter, by 
giving an overview of the development of CSDP – its external and internal drivers, state 
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proposals, institutional configuration and controversies and divergences in preferences - 
applies the theory by illustrating both the control states have had over the process, their 
interests in developing the policy and limitations set by the EU system. The third 
chapter gives a broad overview of state leadership and capacity to do so in foreign and 
security policy-making in the EU, flowed by a closer analysis of French interests, 
motivations and ideas for European security and Europe in international security, 
together with establishing the connection and prevalent interest France has in Africa. 
The fourth chapter gives an overview of EU military missions to Africa - Operation 
Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR and Operation Atalanta – congruently with 
an investigation into the mission authorization process and its outcomes, thus 
illustrating both French leadership and the need for acquiescence form others, primarily 
from the United Kingdom and Germany.  
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1. Theorizing European Political Cooperation  
1.1. Perspectives on Integration  
 
The EU as an International Power. The European project with the EU operating in 
international security has been conceptualized, analysed and explained by scholars 
using various approaches. Among others, theories have focused on: the actor-ness of the 
EU; the ESDP/CSDP acting as a counterweight to the United States; on the character of 
Europe or what type of power it can be perceived as – a civilian or soft power; a 
normative power; a strategic power or a small power – in effect, attempting to find the 
right qualifying adjective (Bickerton et al. 2011; Howoth 2007; Pohl 2013a). 
Underlying this pursuit are the peculiarities of the EU. The collective operating as an 
international actor carries considerable weight due to being the biggest common market 
with substantial military resources, voting power in international organizations, and 
with a larger population total than the United States that nevertheless punches below its 
weight or underperforms on the global stage in matters of security and defence 
(Bickerton 2012: 154). But those approaches do not focus on member states and their 
interests and as such, while offering insights to the supranational EU, are insufficient in 
analysing member state leadership.  
 
The Improbability of a Common Policy. Another strand, as discussed by Ojanen (2006: 
58), in the research on security cooperation within the European integration framework 
has either concentrated on the absence or on the improbability of having such a 
development. Realist-based theories saw integration as a phenomenon wherein states in 
control of the process act to strengthen themselves, with decision making rights 
delegated in spheres of low politics when the subtotal of gains exceed those of losses. 
Renouncing authority in matters of security, defence and foreign policy i.e. high politics 
that form the core of national sovereignty, is seen as weakening the state in this zero-
sum game (ibid.). In the functionalist approach this process of integration, once 
pursued, would lead to mechanisms of spill-over from one field to the next, intensifying 
the creation of a political community while lessening the control of states, because it 
would require a central, supranational institution to manage and govern the common 
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policies. In effect, the states would cede a considerable degree of sovereignty in order to 
make the system practicable. Thus, states would have no interest in this 
counterproductive action (Ojanen 2006: 59-60).  
Contrary to those expectations, the EU has been endowed with certain legal basis, 
military capabilities and security instruments in the fields of foreign, security and 
defence policy by its member states that furthermore have placed these policy fields in a 
complex and intertwined institutional architecture which nonetheless has not superseded 
national policies and has been operationalized with several military missions operating 
in a wider geographical scope than merely the EU`s neighbouring areas or theatres of 
direct interests. As such, evoking the questions of what factors have led to integration 
and are shaping the outcome in the field of security and defence from state to EU-level 
and what interests drive and explain the EU`s co-occurring military ambitions? 
 
1.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalist Response to Integrationist 
Endeavours 
 
Integration as a Two-Level Game. Foreign and security issues as policies have specific 
characteristics, due to the sensitivity and meaning in terms of state sovereignty, given to 
the sphere by national governments, implying questions of interest-formation and 
control. Therefore, when transferred onto the EU-level, although a common policy has 
been created and utilized, the issue-area has been characterized by being relatively 
isolated from the rest of the EU integration project, by being developed at a rapid pace 
when internal and external incentives for the member states arose and in spite of various 
setbacks, and by its substance being shaped by distinct mechanisms, with the Franco-
British dyad being a crucial force (Kurowska 2008). In consequence of that, to analyse 
the creation, shape and form of the Common Security and Defence Policy, I will apply 
Andrew Moravcsik`s (1999) liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) framework. Since, the 
central argument of LI is of integration being a two-level game: of national preference 
formation and of interstate strategic interaction (Moravcsik 1993). Focusing on 
domestic preferences alone leaves out the strategic context in which states interact and 
focusing solely on interstate bargaining or on the international institutions omits the 
distribution and variation in preferences (ibid.). In sum, LI takes into account both 
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member state preferences in shaping and forming a security policy and the context of 
the EU that places limits on the outcomes.  
 
The Importance of Domestic Context. Nation states and their leaders constrained by 
national preference formation and inter-state strategic bargaining, make rational choices 
to maximize their gains; with the primary interest of governments in liberal democracies 
being that of remaining in office. Operating through EU institutions allows to gain 
otherwise unachievable goals by providing avenues for more effective allocation of 
domestic resources, increasing the efficiency of interstate bargaining and by 
strengthening the position of national political leaders vis-à-vis their domestic 
opposition (Moravcsik 1993). But it is domestic politics that provides the context and 
interests that require EU-level cooperation, thus LI attributes causal force to domestic 
sources in determining what the EU does, including in the CSDP framework (ibid.).  
Although, there are commonalities across states, rationality with its underlying 
preferences is not fixed, but more context specific and contingent on the pressure from 
domestic social groups (the electorate, parties, interests groups and bureaucracies). 
Depending on the case, both the cross section of the particular groups and the amount of 
pressure applied may vary and alter across time and issues, between and within states 
(Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2004: 77; Moravcsik 1993: 483). Since policy-making, 
issues and their outcomes do not carry equal weight or interest; the internal pressure can 
be indirect, ambiguous or divided. Accordingly, the looser constrains allow for a wider 
degree of discretion, manifesting in political risk-taking to pursue a longer-term view, in 
broader coalitions and/or goals, in accepting short-term losses for long-term gains, or 
engaging in more controversial or idiosyncratic goals (Moravcsik 1993: 488). 
Nonetheless, domestic choices are aggregated through indigenous political institutions, 
resulting in a unitary actor with a set of national interests or goals expressed in interstate 
negotiations (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2004: 77; Moravcsik 1993: 483).  In turn, 
the international system and in particular the environment of the EU, also have its own 
structural-institutional constrains, placing restrictions on potential outcomes (Rosamond 
2000: 136-137). The assumption is that, as a stage for bargaining, the EU has three 
specific characteristics (i) states enter into it voluntarily, moreover important decisions 
are made by unanimity, (ii) it is information-rich, both in regard to constrains and 
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preferences, (iii) transaction costs are low and can even strengthen domestic autonomy 
(Rosamond 2000: 137-138).  
 
1.3. Preference Formation and Agenda Setting  
 
As discussed, states face limits in preference formation on the domestic level and 
constraints on agenda setting on the EU-level. In part, to mitigate the effects of these 
complications states either use the EU as a facilitator or they transfer sovereignty to its 
institutions. The latter course is taken when the potential joint gains in pursuing 
preferences through delegating to a central body are more substantial, effective and 
lessen the problems of control than they would be when using other means. By 
lessening the influence of domestic politics and strengthening supranational oversight 
such conduct enhances compliance. The degree of delegation depends on value placed 
on issues and on the acceptability of potential outcomes (Moravcsik & 
Schimmelfenning 2004: 80). As such the EU level negotiations are cooperative and 
reflect patterns in the preferences of national governments (Moravcsik 1993). 
Although, European integration has been predominantly driven by economic 
preferences, purely single issue-specific explanation is not enough to account neither for 
the institutional design of the EU nor for the policies covered under EU purview. As 
such, LI allows for ideological or geopolitical preferences to have some impact on 
integration (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2004: 79). And when specifically analysing 
the dynamics and developments of CSDP the impetus for integration can be attributed 
to a mixture of economic, ideological and geopolitical factors.  
 
Deepening and Widening of the Security Paradigm. Factoring into the development of 
CSDP has been the shift in the meaning and reach of security in accordance with events 
in the post-Cold War international order. Traditionally, making and implementing 
security and defence policy has been the role of either nation states or military alliances. 
Besides questions of autonomy and control, in regards to national identity being 
interlinked with security and defence, the primary notion to content with would have to 
be that of existential threat to territory. Yet territorial defence is outside the remit of 
CSDP (Pohl 2013a), since there has been a change in what constitutes as security and 
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how to respond to threats. Extreme poverty and underdevelopment, migration, endemic 
diseases and epidemics, famine and environmental disasters, together with newer forms 
of challenges such as climate change, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, 
organized crime, and state failure - these broadened and deepened conceptualizations 
have been integrated into the international agenda, both as primary causes of human 
suffering and as more traditional military threat multipliers, forming a complex 
interlinked nexus of threats. This composite agenda requires a more comprehensive, 
cross-border approach, since pure military power is insufficient as an effective 
instrument in addressing a multifaceted world (Kaunert & Zwolski 2013). 
Concomitantly with new issues rising to the forefront, the questions shifted to 
legitimacy of using force and military power outside the purview of national territorial 
defence against external threats. In this context, the utility of the EU as a collective 
actor - a grouping of sovereign states, with a variety of political and economic 
instruments at its disposal - in security matters emerged (Sjursen 2001). But the process 
of integration has been dominated by the need to balance between two opposing 
imperatives: as a collective the EU has more influence and power in the world, than 
member states have individually, countered by the questions of maintaining sovereignty 
and freedom to act in national interests (McCormick 2002). Thus, in conjunction with 
international developments, the EU`s reach has extended from foreign policy to first 
include security and then defence, with the locus of security tasks shifting towards non-
territorial threats and operations in third countries. In defining its security role, the EU 
ascribes to ´new` security tasks (Sjursen 2001: 195).  
 
1.4. Costs and Benefits of Integration 
 
In the context of evolving multifaceted threats comprising the subjects/objects of 
foreign and security policy, the variation of domestic salience of specific issues within 
that amalgamation and the pursuit of interests by national governments, this rationalist 
logic brings in a second range of motives. Namely, considerations over material costs 
and gains can be integrated into the analysis of the government decision making 
process. While in Moravcsik`s view (1993: 494) a common foreign and security policy 
aims to provide non-socio-economic goods, there is a strong economic aspect attached 
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both to the framework of the policy and its various forms of implementation. Or as put 
by Ojanen (2006: 61) in security and defence “states can clearly gain materially from 
joining forces, shared planning, common standards, and of course from defence 
industrial co-operation and economies of scale. Also immaterial gains could be 
expected, as in cases where it is in state`s interests to support defence integration in 
exchange for concessions in other fields or use of power through an organization rather 
than in ´crude` form.”  
On the other hand, governments need to demonstrate that they are not paying a 
disproportionate price for action when operating within the CSDP framework. If the 
result is negative externalities, then there is incentive to free ride rather than to 
cooperate. Furthermore, conflict is inherent, since costs and benefits are unevenly 
distributed among and within states; those with less to gain are likely to oppose moves 
within the politico-institutional application of CSDP (Moravcsik 1993). Outcome is 
determined by relative power and the asymmetries in the relative intensity of national 
preferences. The less intense the preference for agreement, the greater the bargaining 
leverage. The need to compromise with the least forthcoming government sets the limits 
of the possible outcome and driving the agreement towards the lowest common 
denominator (ibid.). In cases where the EU level agreement is not the best option and 
alternatives offer a value, the states can have several options for action: either taking a 
unilateral approach, forming coalitions where certain states are excluded, bi-and 
multilateral deals and formations, deepening cooperation in alternative institutions or 
favouring cooperation from larger states whose participation in needed for viability 
(Moravcsik 1993). 
 
The Risks and Opportunities of the Diffuse Costs and Public Opinion in Foreign Policy. 
On the subject of foreign policy, the costs and benefits for assorted groups are more 
diffuse and uncertain than they are in regards to various economic policies. As such, 
with less interest in the field, they assert less pressure, leaving domestic influence 
primarily to partisan elites and secondarily (albeit intermittently) to mass publics. The 
reasoning to justify policies tends to shift from calculated and concise to symbolic and 
ideological; giving rise to ideologically motivated heads of state and permitting them 
(especially those of larger member states) to come to the fore and to influence European 
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institutions to reflect their conceptions of national interests (Moravcsik 1993: 494). Pohl 
(2013a: 317) has highlighted two underlying domestic politically beneficial incentives 
for governments in CSDP crisis management. First, demonstrating influence on the 
international stage in accordance with domestic values and priorities can strengthen 
governments position since their legitimacy might be threatened by inaction, whether 
they are unwilling or unable to exert influence (especially in a highly mediatized 
context). Secondly, there is a threat of paying a seemingly too high price for action (in 
monetary or casualty terms). The risk and opportunity lies within either ignoring or 
taking account of public opinion and broader societal values (ibid.). As such there is an 
incentive to cater to the pressure of public opinion and the pressure from foreign policy 
elites (in the media, political parties, NGO´s bureaucracies and academia) and to ensure 
that the constituents judge the policies as legitimate and competent. Although, direct 
public opinion has more traction in cases that capture headlines (Pohl 213a: 317).  
Arguably, when looking at the succession wars in the former Yugoslavia and the 
European public`s expectations and concerns about their governments (in)action in 
defending the values of European societies that had come to be their defining trait, were 
pivotal in prompting their involvement (or lack of willingness in the case of Germany). 
This background of earlier failure had a role in informing the decision to launch the 
CFSP itself and the conducting of the first CSDP mission in Macedonia and its largest 
one in Bosnia (Pohl 2013a: 318). Alleviating a humanitarian crisis - or a visible, albeit 
useless act in that effect - brings about a perception of action, the danger for a 
government lies in the balance between pointless activism and excessive risk-taking 
versus complacency and weakness. The suitable emphasis placed on interventionism, 
together with preferences over where and how, depend on geographic and historical 
factors and thus vary across member states (Pohl 2013a: 318).  
 
1.5. Institution Building vs. National Governments 
 
The EU`s powers and remit in foreign, security and defence fields has come to cover a 
comprehensive security paradigm with the concomitant, albeit scattered tools for crisis 
management operated by a complex and multilevel institutional framework. Before 
creating an internal military component, the EU member states had recourse to various 
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external organizations: WEU, NATO, and the UN. Hofmann (2011) has argued that 
creating an institutional overlap with multiple centres of political authority can both 
resolve and aggravate inter-state disagreement. One of the consequences is the range of 
strategic choices available - both in terms of constraining and empowering - to actors in 
order to achieve their preferences. For instance, being a member of several 
organizations allows for forum shopping, being a member of one institution can foster 
feelings of exclusion from decision-making processes leading to vetoing decisions. In 
both cases actors can politicise the resources and mandate dimensions of overlap to their 
advantage (Hofmann 2011).  
The institutional structure of CSDP has been a matter of choice and negotiations, with 
NATO structure as the main model. The end-result - the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European 
Union Military Staff (EUMS) – followed the given template, without substantial or 
significant controversy about the institutions as such (Hofmann 2011: 108). In creating 
a common representative, first with the position of High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and then with High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, the aim was to foster coherence and cooperation. But there 
are caveats of how much leeway the positions are allowed to have; they can expect 
close monitoring and oversight, with approval of autonomous decisions from member 
states. Moreover, the people filling the positions must be perceived as neutral and 
suitable by member states, before acquiring consent to fill the position (Moravcsik 
1993: 511).  
This institution building follows a dual logic: increasing efficiency and ensuring 
enforcement vs. ceding an acceptable amount of control. Since the commitment is to 
broad goals with the final oversight at the hands of national governments, bestowing a 
measure of agenda-setting power to EU institutions can offer a degree of efficiency. The 
bureaucracy can both act as a neutral information provider and as an arbiter in decision-
making, in addition to playing a role in agenda-setting, forming the policy and 
identifying areas where there is overlap of means and ends (Moravcsik 1993: 511; 
Dijkstra 2012; Toje 2008: 133). Cooperation is also increased with a neutral 
enforcement regime in place that lessens the government‟s reaction to evade 
inconvenient responsibilities and thereby weaken the whole system. This action, while 
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strengthening the credibility of the commitment also carries political risk (Moravcsik 
1993:512). To alleviate negative consequences, member states protect their national 
interests and identity ostentatiously, by laying blame for domestically contentious issues 
on Brussels on the one hand. On the other, as is the case with CSDP, EU-level 
suggestions have remained dependent on member states willingness to engage (Pohl 
2013a). 
 
Limits Placed on EU Institutions. National governments in the EU`s Council of 
Ministers are regarded as the crucial actors in decision-making, while the criticism 
against this school of thinking has pointed out the lack of understanding of the role of 
EU-level processes and other institutions and overstating the government`s powers, a 
counterargument is that the institutional and political character of CSDP places it firmly 
in the hands of the Council and due to its military subject-matter it is not part of day-to-
day politics (de Flers et al. 2012: 296); executive authority is needed for decision-
making in military coercion. The Commission is active in the delivery and 
implementation of CFSP in many ways, since a large part of external relations and 
foreign policy involves trade and economic policy (Howorth 2007). Although, both the 
Commission, the Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can act as wilful 
policy entrepreneurs and setters, for instance by side-lining the Council using 
technicalities or through case law; as such they can both temper member states interest, 
restrict options and influence specific policies and manipulate policy preferences. There 
has been fear of ´competence creep` with the Commission gaining influence in the 
defence field, for instance the British concern over the Commission adopting directives 
on defence trade (Bond 2013).  
In general, government calculations over delegating or pooling sovereignty are 
influenced by the probability of the end result being an unforeseen, biased decision that 
negatively affects their interests (Moravcsik 1993: 511). With CSDP, governments have 
neither pooled national sovereignty nor delegated powers to a substantial degree to 
central institutions since the primary institutional input comes from agencies of 
intergovernmentalism; it is not under the direct control of the supranational branches of 
the EU (the Commission, the Parliament or the Courts); instead they have preferred 
imperfect enforcement and inefficient decision-making structures (Moravcsik 1993: 
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509). If governments are the sole crucial decision-makers then the outcomes reflect their 
interests, with non-decisions and sub-optimal results being the result of bargaining (de 
Flers et al. 2012).   
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2. Institution-Building in Foreign and Security Policy 
2.1. The Drivers for Enhanced Cooperation in Security  
 
The End of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War the processes of disintegration 
and integration collided. A mixture of external and internal factors - the dissipation of 
the Soviet threat, the unification of Germany, and the uncertainty and instability in its 
neighbourhood – ushered in a re-evaluation of the European project that hitherto had 
mainly focused on economic matters. Internally, the foreseeable enlargements to the 
east initiated proactive moves to maintain cohesion and develop closer cooperation. 
Working together within NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) on the one 
hand had led to a degree of convergence in policies. On the other, with no meaningful 
role for the WEU, and with the focus of NATO in conjunction with the United States 
shifting from Europe, leaving room for a new framework for the assumption of security 
responsibilities (Howorth 2007; Ojanen 2006). Furthermore, coupled with a favourable 
public opinion, the end of conscription (in some European states) and changes in 
questions about territorial defence, security and defence were moving away from high 
politics and becoming issues of low politics (Ojanen 2006: 63). 
 
The Maastricht Treaty. In 1992 the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (The Maastricht 
Treaty) for the first time consigned a security function to the newly formed EU. The 
limited and voluntary European Political Cooperation (EPC), was remodelled with new 
instruments and decision-making procedures together with the revitalization and 
appropriation of WEU into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in part as 
a move towards a closer political union to counterbalance economic motives (Cameron 
2012: 34-35; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 34, Sjursen 2001). However, the level of 
integration in CFSP remained low: the EU institutions were given limited competences, 
decisions were taken unanimously, and the external representation was at the hands of 
the rotating EU presidency (Klein & Wessels 2013: 457; Cameron 2012).  Although, 
negotiations over placing the policy under community method and qualified majority 
voting took place before Maastricht, the absolute refusal of countries such as France and 
the UK quashed those ideas (Howorth 2007: 63). Nor did the Treaty provide a 
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framework or capabilities for military action since the Franco-German proposal to fully 
merge the WEU with the EU was turned down by the UK`s Conservative government, 
fearing the weakening of NATO (Hofmann 2011: 106). Allowance was made for a 
potential future defence policy “eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence,” (TEU Article J.4) but overall, the text of the 
Maastricht Treaty was vague enough to satisfy divergent views of those like France, 
who wanted to see stronger integration and those like the UK who wished to continue 
within the framework of existing structures (Sjursen 2001: 191).  
 
Institutional and Capability Shortfalls. These procedural and institutional developments 
proved of limited utility for the EU in its role as a peacemaker. Coinciding with the 
break-up of Yugoslavia and the onset of war in 1991, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, 
the lack of resources – no defence institutions geared towards territorial defence, no 
deployable armed forces, no common strategic culture – to project force abroad became 
clear (Freire 2008: 11). There were modest and mainly low-key diplomatic successes, 
mostly in areas employing technical and financial resources, but the lack of consensus 
to employ the WEU left the EC/EU on the side-lines (Bowen 2005: 103; Cameron 
2012). This experience of weak collective performance in their neighbourhood, the 
tensions with the United Sates over their reaction and lack of input in overall 
peacebuilding efforts, facilitated by changes in government in the UK, Germany and 
France, coupled with an emergence of an international community with humanitarian 
norms, led to policy reassessments that influenced the EU policy makers to rethink the 
Union`s overall practices and policies in order to acquire international credibility 
(Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006; Sheperd 2009). While France had been intermittently 
(ever since the very beginning of the European project) advocating for a stronger role 
for the collective in security, for Germany and the EC/EU as an institution, the failure to 
stop atrocities highlighted a discord between identity perception and actual behaviour 
(Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 36). Thus, governments recognized the need for closer 
cooperation to redress aforementioned shortfalls.  
In endowing the EU with capabilities in security matters, there have been two general 
factors influencing state positions and their preferred outcomes. The first being relations 
with the United States and NATO. The second, views on the European project, its 
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ultimate shape and form, itself, since member states prioritize different policy issues 
and institutional means of achieving their particular preferences. Integration in matters 
of foreign and security policy has been coupled with the notion of a ´Political Union`, 
therefore garnering resistance from those member states whose primary interest is 
economic integration and from those who are concerned with ceding sovereignty the 
supranational institutions (Sjursen 2001). Underlying these divisions is a philosophical 
difference on the nature of European security between the member states, with countries 
falling broadly into two fractions. First, supported by the United Kingdom - together 
with countries like the Netherlands and Portugal – are the so-called Atlanticists, with 
the preference of strengthening the role and identity of European countries in NATO for 
the benefit of the latter. The other side, the Europeanist/integrationist such as France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain prefer entrusting the EU with autonomous security capacity 
(Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 37; McCormick 2002: 200). Since member states had 
an interest in ameliorating deficiencies, convergence was found in framing issues 
mainly in terms of peace support operations, leaving significant policy differences 
dormant, but intact (ibid.). 
 
2.2. Adding institutional Complexity with a New Role 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam. The redressing of shortfalls was made in 1997 with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. By incorporating the Petersberg Tasks of the WEU into CFSP, 
states endowed the EU with a basis to undertake a spectrum of military crisis 
management operations. Full role acquirement through the merger with the WEU was 
vetoed by the UK, arguing that it would weaken NATO (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 
2006: 38; Sjursen 2001). The treaty also created the position of High Representative for 
the CFSP, together with Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to add coherence. 
Although, the post of HR was created in June 1997, the first appointment, that of Javier 
Solana took until the summer of 1999. Member States had to agree on the suitable level 
of seniority and political remit of the appointee; France purportedly preferred a high-
profile French politician, the UK a mid-career civil servant and both saw having 
influence as paramount (Howorth 2007: 66; Howorth 2010).  
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Another institutional component created was the, ambassadorial-level, Political and 
Security Committee (COPS) tasked with monitoring the international situation, drafting 
opinions for the Council and overseeing the agreed policies. However, as pointed out by 
Howorth (2007: 68) the institution can be bypassed and its work hindered by national 
capitals. In the event of a real crisis, such as Iraq in 2002-03 COPS was kept at arm‟s 
length with instructions for some ambassadors from their respective MFA`s to keep the 
issue off the agenda. The degree of influence given to COPS was also under discussion, 
with diverging views on the appropriate seniority of the representation. France preferred 
senior ambassadorial representation that they could keep on point and who could lead 
the process, in addition to seeing the need for COPS to be high-level and influential 
(Howorth 2007). The UK preferred a lower level institution, proposing both an 
upgraded Political Committee and double-hatted permanent representatives shared with 
NATO, ideas rejected by France. The trade-off reached at Helsinki in 1999 was a 
relatively high profile COPS (with different level envoys) in exchange for elaboration 
of military capacity (Howorth 2007: 70).  
 
Attempts to bypass deadlock.  A cautious effort to bypass the deadlock of unanimity 
was made with the introduction of the principle of ´constructive abstention`, allowing 
states to declare reservations and to stand aside to not block adoption of a decision, but 
the principle does not apply to military and defence matters, negating its impact in 
approaching contentious issues (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 38). The Amsterdam 
Treaty in Article J.13 does make allowance for using qualified majority voting, but only 
in cases “when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision 
on the basis of common strategy” or when adopting a decision implementing such acts. 
An additional clause clarified that member states can block using qualified majority by 
declaring the issue as part of national policy. In this case, the Council can use qualified 
majority to refer the issue to the European Council for decision by unanimity (ibid.). 
Furthermore, this does not apply to decisions having military or defence implications 
(ibid.). Even though, adjustments to the CFSP were made, the overall changes were 
seen as minimal and therefore dependent on how the institutional changes were 
implemented and whether member states had political will to use the provisions of the 
policy (Sjursen 2001: 194).  
23 
  
 
Continued Limited Utility and Capacity Shortfalls. Once again, in spite of these 
institutional changes, the EU was unable to secure a solution with diplomatic means and 
with economic sanctions in Kosovo. (Freire 2008: 11) It became clear to European 
states that in some cases diplomatic action requires complementing it with more 
substantial military action. Moreover, the inability to take responsibility for security in 
their own continent highlighted the shortfalls in military capabilities, hindering 
European credibility as a shaper of international policy and security (Shepherd 2009). 
The permissive international and domestic environments offered an opportunity for a 
more forceful role for the EU. As the global demand for various security assistance and 
crisis management missions increased forming a notion of an international community 
that has a responsibility to protect built on a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 
Thus, there was an impetus to adapt to the meet the need (Shepherd 2009). Internally, 
the UK, under the leadership of Tony Blair, was seeing increased frustrations with the 
United States. There have been several causes or mixtures thereof put forth to explain 
the transformation in the British stance - disagreements over former Yugoslavia, Blair`s 
desire to lead a more active European policy - whatever the specific amalgamation of 
the root causes, it did act as a catalyst for conspicuous development since a major 
obstacle to strengthening the CFSP had been neutralized (Menon 2004: 224). In this 
situation of formalized support to peace operations on the one hand and a gap in 
capabilities to act on the other, the two militarily most powerful states in Europe 
proposed a new policy (Howorth 2007: 207). 
 
2.3. Military Cooperation and Capacity Building  
 
The Franco-British Dyad. The seminal moment for the EU as a security actor came at 
the St. Malo Franco-British Summit in December 1998, when both governments agreed 
that the EU needed to become a stronger independent actor (Howorth 2007). Joint 
Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (1998) stating that “to this end, the 
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises” when NATO is not involved, with the European Council operating 
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on an intergovernmental basis as the principal decision-maker. Both London and Paris 
began to argue that pooling military capabilities to project power was necessary to keep 
international order and security, to hinder the creation of international division of labour 
in peacekeeping and-building matters; and moreover it would protect European interests 
(Klein & Wessels 2013; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 38-39).  
Still, the two parties diverged on their envisioned ends. The UK, with its new and less 
Euro-sceptic government, saw strengthening of the European security sector as a way to 
bolster NATO and to add to its credibility; deeming EU-level security as a potential 
´capability driver` (Menon 2009: 232). Principal fear was that of American 
disengagement from the continent if the Europeans do not share their part of the burden. 
The UK`s position has been partly motivated by its overall reservations about a strong 
political role for the EU, thus the support it has given to foreign and security aspects has 
been conditional on consensus based decision making among the member states and on 
lack of interference from central EU institutions, namely the Commission and the 
Parliament (Sjursen 2001). 
On the other side, the traditional French Gaullist objective, strengthening its influence 
by strengthening that of Western Europe, while concomitantly working towards the 
construction of ´Europe politique`, had remained the same. For Paris, the difference was 
in partners, instead of cooperating with Germany, it acted together with the United 
Kingdom. What is more, France saw an autonomous and capable EU in security affairs 
as a way to diminish the dependence on the United States. Congruently, France also saw 
security cooperation as a way to be more efficient and eliminate underperformance, by 
accomplishing greater complementarity and the avoidance of costly duplication 
(Bickerton et al 2011; Bowen 2005; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 39-40).  
Despite their differences, in general both London and Paris wanted for the Europeans to 
take military instruments more seriously and more specifically, for them to concentrate 
on the development of expeditionary capabilities to prepare for participation in high 
intensity combat operations (Simón 2012). To have a tangible effect, the St Malo 
initiative needed the support of other EU member states and actors. Germany, the third 
influential player whose contributions were essential for security integration, supported 
the proposition. Its domestic security narrative had been developing towards taking a 
more proactive role in international efforts for peace and security. In addition its 
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political parties and the coalition government supported further creation of such a 
project on the EU level (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006: 40). The German EU 
presidency softened the initial Franco-British conception by highlighting the need for 
consensus and UN approval in line with their overall outlook (Simón 2012). 
 
Differing views and Member State Preferences. Based on the St Malo Declaration and 
the set political course, the 15 EU heads of state and government made the decision at 
the Cologne European Council in June 1999 to enhance the CFSP through the European 
Security and Defence Policy (Howorth 2007). With these moves the EU was on the path 
to developing a distinct military aspect for crisis management. Since military 
capabilities or lack thereof were not the only influencing factors in decision making 
about the ESDP, the final outcome reflected a consensus of different views. Smaller 
member states had reservations and concerns about the proposed militarization of the 
Union. Countries like Finland and Sweden insisted on infusing civilian instruments into 
to the policy to allow for a more multifaceted role for EU`s peacebuilding efforts (Freire 
2008; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 41). The Nordic countries were supported by 
Germany`s social democratic-green coalition (Menon 2004: 229). Another contentious 
issue concerned giving the EU a collective defence function. Since nonaligned member 
states were reluctant, Austria cited constitutional requirements, and the UK, Poland, 
Czech Republic and the Baltic states saw it as superfluous as there already was a 
corresponding NATO commitment, it was not included in the final document. 
(Hofmann 2011: 108; Irondelle 2008: 157) France and the UK tried to keep the 
geographical reach and legal basis of potential future missions as vague as possible, 
while others wished to emphasise that the EU-forces would act in accordance with the 
United Nations Charter and the OSCE Charter of European Security (Bailes 2008: 115).  
 
Institutionalizing the ESDP and Taking on Capacity Goals. At the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1999, the basic structure, covering both military and civilian 
aspects was emplaced, resulting in the ESDP. The intergovernmental nature remained; 
although the European Council shares the power of initiative, the member states have 
the final say. France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy tabled a joint proposal for 
the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The Council agreed on the Headline Goal 
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(the aim was an army corps of approximately 60,000 troops, 100 ships, and 400 aircraft, 
deployable at 60 days` notice for the duration of one year) (European Parliament 1999; 
Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006: 41). Since both the military and civilian aspects of 
peace support operations had their advocates, in general, advantage of the momentum 
was taken; the fusion created a more holistic approach to security policy in the EU than 
previously envisioned at St.Malo (ibid.). Framing the CSDP around crisis management 
was in line with broader transformations and public perceptions, allowing the EU to 
respond to crises, primarily in and around Europe, that the US/NATO was not interested 
in. At the same time, heavy lifting was left to NATO, allowing the EU to distance itself 
discursively from more heavy handed tactics and approaches, while emphasizing the 
importance of non-military solutions (Simón 2012: 109). 
 
2.4. Strategic Goals vs. Political Will 
 
European Security Strategy. It took years for the EU to agree on its security priorities, 
on the initiative of France, Germany and the UK, the EU`s high representative for 
CFSP, Javier Solana was given a mandate to overcome the previous disparities. As a 
result, The European Security Strategy (ESS), “A Secure Europe in A Better World 
“was adopted at the December 2003 European Council (Cameron 2012: 9). 
As seen with the end of the Cold War, the situations in former Yugoslavia and the 
United States pivot away from Europe, throughout the existence of the EC/EU there has 
been a close interplay between the internal and external developments. The international 
context during the design of the EES included post-9/11 shift in discourse, pre-emptive 
US military actions, and a cleavage between EU members over the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. As the United States was adopting a stronger, unilateral and interventionist 
attitude, the EU in response was to take a softer tone. In essence, while the ESS focuses 
on promoting peace, stability, development and human rights, it focuses on doing so 
through the use of peaceful methods, and moreover by acting cooperatively in using 
´effective multilateralism` under the aegis of the United Nations. Military force was 
seen as the method of last resort and only as a part of a wider, holistic or and 
„comprehensive approach‟ (Bailes 2008: 118).  
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A Strategic and Behavioural Cacophony in Implementation Perspectives. As 
summarised by Biava et al. (2011: 1231-1232) the net result of a relatively vague 
strategy without a clear guideline on the use of force is strategic incoherence, illustrated 
by countries behaviours e.g. Germany`s reluctance to use its troops abroad, Poland`s 
mistrust of others, the UK`s attachment to the US and NATO, and France`s insistence 
on a global role. Alternatively, the differences can be divided into two dominant 
categories, wherein smaller and non-aligned states favour the status quo of limited 
ambitions in crisis management decided by consensus; opposed by former colonial 
powers of France and the United Kingdom, with the will and capacity to act globally 
with force when necessary. Both strands wish to upload the domestic level on to the EU 
(ibid). Added complexity derives from the EU-NATO dichotomy (e.g. NATO 
development of a Rapid Reaction Force and disagreements between different members 
of these organizations i.e. Turkey and Greece, France and United States), as well as 
including the misgivings on the part of certain member states concerning the whole 
project and whether it was a means to an end or an end in itself (Menon 2004). 
Moreover, in some member states themselves (Germany, Sweden, Denmark) there are 
internal tensions between different political and strategic cultures resulting in a 
compromise reflecting the lack of conceptual clarity (Biava et al 2011). 
The ESS was lightly revised and elaborated under the French Presidency in the second 
half of 2008, but countries such as Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden want a new security 
strategy. No official move towards discussing or endorsing a new strategy has been 
made, with France fearing loss of justification for ambitious Headline Goals and 
development plans, German reluctance of projecting military force and the UK wishes 
to increase capabilities not discuss strategy (especially if the strategy is based on the 
lowest common denominator) (Bond 2013). 
In addition to attempts at fostering strategic coherence, in terms of capabilities there 
have been numerous capability conferences, action plans and other initiatives after the 
initial Helsinki Headline Goals. In 2003 the so-called ´Chocolate Summit`, led by 
Germany and France, together Belgium and Luxemburg, called for a more ambitious 
European Security Defence Union as a military command separate from NATO. 
(Menon 2009: 241; Toje 2008)  Yet these schemes have not resulted in considerable 
practical progress. Although, the EU as a bloc is the world`s second largest military 
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actor; with member states collectively spending €194 billion on defence and having 
1.67 million people in uniform in 2009. Out of that, only a fraction, around 10 % or 
approximately 170,000 is deployable and due to the need for rotation that number 
lessens to around 60,000 to 70,000 troops available for sustained expeditionary 
operations at one time. This aggregate consists of fragments, wherein over 75% of 
defence programs are done nationally and without coordination, leading to an 
inadequate interoperability (Biscop & Coelmont 2013: 78; Gomis 2012: 3). In regard to 
Headline Goals, member states have failed to meet the various targets (set by 
themselves) they also have tempered their ambitions: in the Headline Goal 2010, the 
previous goal of approximately 60,000 troops was replaced by battle groups initiative of 
approx. 1,500 troops to be deployable within 15 days (two groups on standby consisting 
of only land forces with restrictions on their rules of engagement). This change has been 
framed as focusing on quality not on quantity. (Bickerton et al. 2011: 6; Giegrich 2008; 
Menon 2009: 233) In theory, the battle groups by being in permanent standby should 
provide a deterrent and preventive force, remedying the ad hoc approach to military 
deployment. In reality, they have never been used (Simón 2012: 108). Every time when 
an opportunity has arisen, the member state in charge has been reluctant to utilize them, 
for both political and economic reasons. First, they see the concept as expensive to 
coordinate and to plan and second in case of application, the member states, in charge, 
should be able and willing to complete the initial task (Fernandez Sola 2013).   
 
Funding Mechanisms. In harmonizing defence efforts and giving the EU a more 
autonomous capacity by setting common qualitative specifications and normative 
expectations has had its limitations. The consensus system allows for a ´framework 
nation` to take the lead role in running operations, with the operational headquarters 
having planning authority. One of the ´big three` has generally executed that position. 
Subsequently, member states like Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden have resisted 
attempts of institutionalization of such approach to politico-strategic decisions (Menon 
2009: 237). Since the CSDP is not legally binding and owing to its design of 
decentralized interstate cooperation, the EU has been forestalled by having no access to 
member states full military forces. Member states have not contributed to the CSDP 
missions according to their abilities and capabilities; since participation and allocation 
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of assets is a matter of choice and the missions that have been undertaken have not been 
in response to member states direct security needs, some prioritize other operations 
(NATO, UN or ad hoc) (Bailes & Cottey 2010). The funding of missions primarily 
follows the principle of costs ´lie where they fall`, meaning that the participating states 
share the transaction expenditure, supplemented by the Athena mechanism, whereby 
states contribute to common costs using a GNI-based index. Member states decide case-
by-case what falls under the definition of ´common` (Menon 2009: 239). Although, this 
arrangement provides incentives for non-participation, but orienting it towards joint 
financing would create incentives for those states that are not interested to block 
missions. Using the other end of the continuum, full common costs, would create fears 
of encouraging excessively interventionist behaviour from some states (ibid.). In the 
context of an economic crisis and budgetary pressures and requirements, national 
defence budgets are under strain and have continued to decrease, with only a few 
European countries investing 2% of their GDP there. These budgetary constraints have 
affected the member states contributions to military and civilian missions (Fernandez 
Sola 2013).  
 
2.5. Fostering Coherence while Remaining in Control 
 
Another larger institutional and instrumental adjustment to the policy in question was 
made with the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. The ESDP 
was transformed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Lisbon 
Treaty in the Article 28 B expanded the definition of the missions covered by the CSDP 
where “the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament 
operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation”.  
In fostering coherence, a more unified voice and centralized structure, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and the positions of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European 
Council, were created. The European Council and the Council of the EU retained their 
centrality in conceptualizing and implementing CFSP, the EEAS took over from 
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previously created bodies in an effort to coordinate all EU activities in foreign and 
security-defence policies (Klein & Wessels 2013: 463). The Court of Justice of the EU 
has no jurisdiction and the European Parliament, aside from being consulted and 
informed by the High Representative, can exert pressure via its budgetary powers (Klein 
& Wessels 2013: 463). 
The European Council`s decision to appoint Herman van Rompuy (of Belgium) as the 
president and Catherine Ashton (of the UK) as the HR, disappointed those who wished 
for a stronger leadership and a clearer ´single address` for the Union for external 
matters, interpreting the choices as timid (Bailes & Cottey 2010: 166). The move 
signalling, as argued by Howorth (2010: 456) that the EU itself would not be setting 
agendas or taking major initiatives; even though consensus is needed to take decisions, 
the process can be facilitated by highly capable individuals. Furthermore, it is not the 
first time for the Council to face this type of personnel dilemma, resembling the 
discussion over the suitable level of the putative appointee for the High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1997, albeit then the decision was 
eventually made on the basis of personal qualities rather than hierarchy (Howorth 
2010).  
In terms of flexible integration, the treaty allowed a group of willing member states to 
form a ´Permanent Structured Cooperation` (PSC) in the field of CSDP, whereby they 
can adopt higher standards, specific goals for equipment cooperation and deployable 
forces, with the possibility of operational tasks being delegated to them (Bailes & 
Cottey 2010: 167). PSC was watered down from its initial Franco-German proposal to a 
vague and inclusive clause without exact requirements. Politically the agreement was to 
allow for only one PSC, but even that was hindered by the financial crisis, making the 
member states more reluctant to define and allocate a specific percentage of GDP to 
national defence budgets (Fernandez Sola 2013). By 2010 the antecedent objectives of 
permanence and ambition were discarded for a looser, a` la carte framework of ´pooling 
and sharing` in order to avoid duplication and maximize resources (Simón 2012) and in 
December 2012 they agreed on further eleven proposals (although many of those have 
remained in the theoretical stages) (Fernandez Sola 2013).  
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Importance of the Head of State or Government. Although, the ultimate political 
authority is in the hands of the member states, aforementioned variety of EU agencies 
are involved in shaping and implementing it, leading to complex politico-institutional 
relations between the centre and its constituent parts. Thus placing limits on the scope 
of CSDP and inducing a division between the need to make the EU more effective and 
coherent on the on hand, and on the other the inclination to keep the centre weak 
(Howorth 2007: 91). In majority of the CSDP cases the Council is able to arrive at 
common positions. Since bulk of the work has been done in various committees, the 
highest level has to welcome what has already been achieved. But in cases where 
member state`s positions are conflicting and preparatory bodies have not reached 
consensus Heads of State or Government are expected to overcome fundamental 
disagreements and reach a constructive common position. That in turn is complicated by 
several factors: Heads of State or Government protect their country`s foreign policy; 
they are influenced by short-term domestic interests; they are not continuously available 
(no permanent leadership); the preparation for discussions is not done on the basis of 
European-level analysis with a common conclusion; they are not necessarily foreign and 
security policy experts; the European Council agenda is crowded with important issues 
not related to foreign policy (even at the height of an external crisis, internal issues are 
at the forefront, for example both Libya and Syria only partially occupied the agenda 
with principal attention going to the EU`s economic and financial situation); the 
European Council not the Foreign Affairs Council has the claim for leadership in crisis 
situations; reluctance to use enhanced cooperation to allow a group of states to move 
forward on an issue; and problems with having a single line of communication (Devuyst 
2012). Instead of one spokesperson there is a cacophony wherein member states 
underline national positions and victories to the press with domestic public in mind, 
oftentimes resulting in a confusing message to the outside  (Devuyst 2012). In spite of 
creating a central elements (the High Representative and the EEAS), the Member States, 
in particular the larger ones, do not pay much heed to them, tending to regard the HR as 
an official to use or to criticize as necessary. Similarly, the EEAS has been designated 
as a junior player by some Member States (e.g. the United Kingdom) (Devuyst 2012: 
343).  
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From the onset the project of having and implementing CSDP has been characterized by 
controversies pertaining to its relations to NATO, the divergent positions on the war in 
Iraq, placing priority either on military or civilian capabilities and action-inaction as a 
response to crises in its neighbourhood and further afield. Moreover, many of the 
policies and frameworks that became parts of CSDP were first agreed outside the EU 
framework by interested member states and then brought onto the table. Member States 
have framed and presented the CSDP using angles suitable to their public; for France it 
is a force and influence multiplier; for the UK it is a limited measure used only when 
the United States does not wish to be involved; for Germany it corresponds to the new 
normative humanitarian culture (Howorth 2007: 58).  This combination of the 
requirement of unanimity on the one hand and creative differences on the other shape 
the functioning of CSDP; its structure of convincing reluctant parties to participate 
works against rapid deployment of military interventions and of divisions to its ultimate 
size and purpose makes it unsuited for long-term strategic planning that would also 
benefit capabilities effectiveness (Menon 2009: 237). Agenda-setting within the CSDP 
is not dominated by a single issue or problem area and can involve any number of 
Member States. Although, more consistency and coherence has been attempted by 
centralizing leadership in the position of High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU officials still compete and are subservient 
to national governments in initiating missions, acquiring consensus and for providing 
necessary means (Smith 2012). While the Lisbon Treaty brought an aspiration for better 
institutional coordination, the system is still characterized by a complexity of the chain 
of command and the institutional separation of civil and military sides (Hynek 2011). 
Concomitantly, member states have opted for alternate routes when those are perceived 
as more useful or viable; there have been several bi-and multilateral initiatives, such as 
the 2010 Franco-British military agreements, the European Air Transport Command, 
Nordic defence cooperation and the Visegrad Battle Group (Fernandez Sola 2013); and 
unilateral and multilateral military operations outside the CSDP framework. In addition, 
the EU`s lack of coherence and internal discord has, to a high degree, been acted out on 
a public stage, with the concomitant lack of forceful action and military contribution in 
cases like the United States military campaign in Iraq or the humanitarian crisis in 
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Darfur, have been seen as proclamations declaring the stagnancy and near obsoleteness 
of ESDP/CSDP (Menon 2004: 225).  
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3. European Security Policy as a French Objective 
3.1. Power Imbalances and Member State Interests  
 
Concomitantly with developing and endowing the EU with foreign, security and 
defence policy capacities, the EU has widened and deepened on a broader spectrum. 
One of the more prominent changes has been the increase in the number of members 
from the 12 states during the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, to the current number of 
28 members, with the unprecedented scope of enlargements in 2004 and 2007, primarily 
to Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of the CSDP, this relatively large grouping of 
states encompasses differing and often opposing views when it comes to approaches to 
security - as exemplified by the divergent views during the developing process and the 
concomitant agreed upon outcomes - from attitudes towards using force and projecting 
power to the legitimacy of interventions and the balance between hard and soft forms of 
power (Menon 2009). In general, falling under three categories: those who do not like 
the idea of peace enforcement missions in general; those like the Nordic countries who 
above questions of force and risk, consider having a tight mandate in accordance with 
international law as an imperative; and countries like the UK and France who in lieu of 
pure legality focus on more normative criteria and perceived need or interest to act 
(Bailes 2008: 124). Overall, this position and states input to the integration project is 
determined by their national foreign policy-making mechanisms that in turn are shaped 
by power (deriving from geography, demography, economic power, military power and 
diplomatic power), interests, identity, strategic culture and political will, both internal 
and external (Keukeleire & Delereux 2014).  
Since the CSDP is not a single unambiguous policy nor is it geared towards a particular 
threat, but ultimately is an issue of political integration, with every enlargement, the 
growth in number and heterogeneity of interests and strategic cultures has multiplied the 
risk of paralysis and clash of visions, in a system based on consensus and unanimity 
(Irondelle 2008: 157; Mérand 2008). Although, this established politico-institutional 
system means that theoretically all member states are equals - in that they all have the 
same ability to promote and block decisions - in reality the 28 countries in the EU as a 
collective are characterized by substantial power discrepancies and scope of interests 
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between the member states. The biggest contrast is between France, the UK and 
Germany on the on hand and smaller member states on the other (Keukeleire & 
Delereux 2014). Thus, form the onset as exemplified by the policy development 
process, the three biggest EU member states have been the driving forces behind CSDP, 
but they as well have not been equally active in the field. Envisaging the EU as a 
capable and visible military power with the accompanying drive towards engineering a 
strategic vision and pushing for policy application and instrumentalization has 
principally been done by France, while the UK and Germany have maintained a lesser 
degree of interest with a greater variation in involvement (Gegout 2010: Lehne 2012). 
 
The Big Three. The countries with more power and capabilities behave and react 
differently to crises with different interests, objectives, responsibilities, and internal and 
external expectations (Keukeleire & Delereux 2014). The three biggest countries – 
Germany, France and the UK – besides standing out from the rest of the group, in terms 
of military power, form a dyad among themselves. On the one side are France and the 
UK, both nuclear powers that have regional influence in former colonial domains and a 
seat at the UN SC, coupled with the possibility for unilateral or independent (military) 
action and wide diplomatic reach (Howorth 2007). On the other is Germany, it does not 
share all of these assets and its ambitions are weighed down by history, however it is the 
world‟s fourth-biggest economy and one of the biggest export nations (Lehne 2012). In 
aggregate, the three have more than 40 per cent of EU`s population, nearly 50 per cent 
of its GDP, around 60 per cent of its military expenditures, and around 40 per cent of 
EU`s diplomats work for them in more than 750 bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
missions (Lehne 2012: 5). In sum, since the bigger countries own the majority of assets 
(diplomatic, military and monetary) they have more contribute, both in terms of 
assessing any given situation and in suggesting and implementing a suitable policy line. 
Germany has been reform-minded and has supported the forming of a common policy, 
but it has not exercised strong leadership. Its ambitions in international military 
engagements have been narrower and more limited, deriving from constitutional 
limitations and culture of pacifistic aversion, with focus being on maintaining economic 
strength and in recent years managing the Eurozone crisis (Lehne 2012). The United 
Kingdom has throughout the European project had a contentious relationship with the 
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EU and its predecessors, so much so that the question of its membership is still 
unresolved. Moreover, its most important security relationship is with the United States. 
Thus, it has safeguarded the primacy of national foreign policy using the EU actively 
and pragmatically when it serves to promote national interests (Lehne 2012). 
The other large countries, Italy, Spain and Poland are more limited in their ambitions to 
areas with historical or geographical ties (ibid.). Smaller member states, can have 
specific assets to offer to the collective; privileged contacts with specific countries or 
regions (including with former colonies (e.g. Portugal or shared history e.g. the Baltic 
States) or other forms of immaterial power embodied in their reputation (e.g. The 
Nordic countries) as a neutral mediator, as a major donor of aid or as a provider of 
peacekeeping troops. In turn they gain more influence on the international arena than 
they would otherwise have, by appearing active or supportive a state can expect a 
reciprocal move in the future (Lehne 2012).  
 
3.2. Security Cooperation as a French Vision 
 
The objective of the European project from the onset has been peace and security with 
integration as a way to achieve it (Major & Mölling 2007). For France, Europe and 
developing a European foreign and security policy has been a central objective. 
Although, aspects of proposals have changed over time, the underlying principles have 
remained constant. During the early stages of the European integration process, France 
was the initiator of several security policy initiatives, such as the Pleven Plan in 1950s 
and the Fouchet plans in the 1960s (ibid.).  
The end of the Cold War with the concomitant changes in the international security 
environment influenced France to rethink its policy; recognizing strategic and capability 
shortfalls in responding to new threats and military conflicts (the Balkans) with the need 
to address its concerns over both the growing unipolarity of the US and the re-
unification of Germany (Major & Mölling 2007). Leading Mitterrand`s government to 
push for a more united Europe, that resulted in the creation of CFSP with the Maastricht 
Treaty, followed by the subsequent developments that were engineered with strong 
French input (Irondelle 2008: Menéndez Alarcón 2014: 31). Domestically, expressed in 
the 1994 White Paper (Livre Blanc) (with a predecessor in 1972) on security and 
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defence, the development of a European defence was made into a priority, endowed 
with a dual purpose of acting as a counterweight in the world and as a means to uphold 
stability within Europe. Focus also shifted from territorial defence to crisis management 
and multilateral commitments, both as a means to sharpen their own abilities and to 
demonstrate international influence; acting in parallel to wider trends in international 
security (Major & Mölling 2007: 5).  
Aside from capacity insufficiencies, French interest in endowing the EU with foreign 
and security policy means arises from a more fundamental mixture of factors: 
disintegration of its colonial empire (and loosing wars of independence fought against 
it) with the concomitant weakening of power, the decrease of importance of the French 
language, culture and networks, in addition to the need to realign military and 
diplomatic efforts with its commercial interests, and a growing disillusionment with the 
UN`s peacekeeping efforts (Major & Mölling 2007; Menéndez Alarcón 2014, Chafer & 
Cumming 2010). Concerns over its diminishing international standing and power 
projection shortfalls derive from the enduring and relatively stable French view of its 
exceptionalism and proper standing in the world, derived from its historical legacy (the 
1789 Revolution), the resultant endowment to promote universal values (i.e. human 
rights) and emphasis on independence (ability to act unilaterally) (Irondelle & 
Besancenot 2010: 22 Krotz & Sperling 2011). In fulfilling its foreign and security 
policy ambitions France has regularly had recourse to the use of force; since 1960`s 
being one of the few nations with the force-projection capabilities and political will to 
do so, even though the structural reality has been that of a gap between the strength of 
the military and the political aspirations (Bowen 2005).  
With this realization that France acting alone cannot be a key international power, these 
principles are transposed externally into the model of Europe as a global power 
achieved by operating through intergovernmentalist institutional framework allowing 
for independence through selective dependence. On this level the French world 
ambitions manifest themselves in the notion of Europe puissance. While not precisely 
defined, it is supposed to mean ´a great power able to have its own foreign policy, to 
defend its values and promote its interests in the world` (Irondelle 2008: 155). The 
assumption is that of a great power in a multipolar world - means for France to be great 
with the dual function of being a force multiplier -  capable of globally defending its 
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interests, guaranteeing its security, with military means if necessary, and behaving as a 
strategic actor (Bowen 2005).  
The single voice of Europe will be determined through intergovernmental consultation 
and bargaining, the resulting amalgamation will be a mixture of single member states 
historical relationships and spheres of interest (Bowen 2005; Irondelle 2008: 156). As 
well as compensating for or managing several shortcomings that France has; budgetary 
constraints and a lack of resources, the growing multilateralization of global issues (e.g. 
trade agreements, climate change issues), and questions of international legitimacy 
(ibid.). To achieve its goals in the EU, France has at different times and for different 
proposals used either Franco-British or Franco-German dyad, most notably the former 
at St Malo and the latter at the so called ´Chocolate Summit`(Major & Mölling 2007). 
The Summit in April 2003 and the resultant Declaration outlined the main French goals 
for the ESDP: general clause of solidarity, framing a supplementary enhanced 
cooperation, reformulation of the Petersberg tasks, creating a European Agency for 
military acquisitions and interoperability, and the creation of a European Security and 
Defence College. Subsequently, most of these propositions have been implemented with 
varying strength (Major & Mölling 2007). 
 
3.3. White Papers on Defence and National Security 
 
These views on the relationships between France and Europe, their positions in the 
world and definitions of interlinkages between concepts and actors, with the post-9/11 
security issues increasing in salience, have been expressed in subsequent White Papers, 
the first ones – on Defence and National Security Policy, and on Foreign Affairs – were 
commissioned by President Sarkozy and released in 2008. Signifying the first 
rethinking of French security and foreign policy since 1994, followed by a White Paper 
on Defence and National Security issued in 2013 (hereafter White Paper). 
The White Papers (2008: 2013) define and outline one of the central tenets of security 
policy for France: the ´European ambition` of turning the EU into a major player in 
crisis management and international security with corresponding capabilities. Moreover 
it is deemed a necessity for the EU as well. While noting disappointments in the EU`s 
developments, the 2008 White Paper (Chapter 7) proposed several goals for the EU that 
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either largely corresponded to the Helsinki Headline Goals or surpassed them in 
ambition, including capabilities to deploy several missions simultaneously, increased 
planning and operational capabilities and sufficient human resources, reforming the 
funding procedures to the principle of financial solidarity and a significant budget for 
CFSP; and advocated for an European White Paper on Defence and Security (ibid.). 
Notably, the ESDP`s intergovernmental nature and development outside treaty 
provisions was underlined (ibid.). While there is a strong integrationist undercurrent, 
this is delimited and constrained by notions of sovereignty, as exemplified by the 
approach towards common strengthened military capabilities. On the one hand in 
defence industries a privileged position should be prescribed to European frameworks 
for optimal results. On the other, certain strategically important areas and their 
maintenance is seen as remaining national e.g. nuclear deterrence and information 
system security. In practice, France defends its armaments industry using protectionist 
measures and majority control (White Paper 2008: 13; Major & Mölling 2007). The 
2013 White Paper, in regards to the CSDP, holds the uniform approach. Expresses 
frustration over the lack of political will from other member states, advocates for 
revitalization and strengthening of the policy and its practical capabilities in order to 
contribute to greater efficacy in spending (the economic aspects of security are an 
overarching thread), and facing up to responsibilities and to become the referent 
framework for responding to complex crises. It also sees the project as a multifaceted 
instrument serving European interests, with the impetus from the European Council to 
develop strategic guidelines and political vision for the future developments; signing a 
driving role for France. Stating the exceptionality of the EU model: “[t]he world 
continues to expect things of Europe – a situation from which France can only benefit: 
the European Union is still the biggest economic and commercial power in the world, 
the second monetary power and the first in terms of humanitarian aid and development 
policy” and maintaining the EU`s credibility and influence as a major issue, France 
perceives this success as a cornerstone in its security in terms of international security 
projection (White Paper 2013: 16). The outlined vision emphasizes the need to remove 
deficiencies and duplication on the EU-level in context of freely agreed 
interdependencies that would strengthen sovereignty through resource availability 
(pooling and sharing), especially in the current financial situation (with implied cutting 
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costs) (White Paper 2013: 20). The exercise of its sovereignty is linked and placed in a 
context of closer political integration in security and defence (White Paper 2013: 17). 
The continuation of principles of independence of nuclear forces, full freedom of 
assessment (no automatic commitment) and freedom of decision is seen as paramount 
(White Paper 2013: 8).  
In addressing one of the primary contentious issues surrounding the CSDP, that of 
relations between the policy and NATO, in both the 2008 and 2013 White Papers, the 
EU and NATO are taken as complementary frameworks and although the 2008 White 
Paper in Chapter 8 advocated for the full participation in NATO structures, that was 
seen as a parallel process with enforcing EU capabilities in crisis management. It 
emphasised both that the EU is a full-fledge actor in crisis management, not merely a 
civilian agency and that “21 members of NATO are members of the EU and have 
undertaken commitments with France in favour of European defence” (ibid.). 
Keeping security and defence matters central but intergovernmental conciliates two 
primary albeit conflicting goals – independence and multilateralism – at the same time it 
is still perceived as moving towards deeper European integration, since there can be no 
political union without common defence; preserving the Gaullist paradigm of strong 
Europe with weak institutions (Irondelle 2008; Irondelle & Besancenot 2010) As such, a 
united Europe fitting a certain mould has been seen as a way to restore the place France 
had occupied in the past; “from de Gaulle`s to Hollande`s points of view, France must 
take the initiative in European affairs and try to lead Europe in creating a dynamic 
organization” (Menéndez Alarcón 2014: 32). Therefore, since France has valued 
military intervention as a foreign policy instrument (as exemplified by the 2008 White 
Paper outlined guidelines for the commitment of armed forces abroad and the prescribed 
operations), with primacy given to military and diplomatic responses over civilian and 
preventive ones, maintaining the flexibility to choose suitable forums in which to pursue 
interests and the ability to plan and conduct operations autonomously or as a lead nation 
in multilateral operation has remained paramount and a constant (Irondelle & 
Besancenot 2010). 
Overall, the development of the ESDP/CSDP has been in accordance with and in 
continuity of the 1994, 2008 and 2013 White Papers, the 2001 Defence Strategy and the 
subsequent military programme bills that have all made the EU a focus of French 
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activities (Major & Mölling 2007). The dual French interest - stabilizing Europe and 
using it as a ´force multiplier`- have been evident throughout the CFSP/ESDP 
development. Among others, the French lobbied for the institutional set up of the policy 
with a reference to a defence dimension in the Maastricht Treaty; pushed for a stronger 
role for the WEU (as a consequents the WEU was integrated into the EU with the 
Amsterdam Treaty) to have a ESDP with a military dimension added to the CFSP; for 
the reform of the defence industry; the inception of permanent intergovernmental ESDP 
structures within the Council; together with the UK for a division between military and 
civilian aspects; for the idea of a European Foreign Minister (renamed as High 
Representative); together with the UK it shaped the HHG and developed the 
Battlegroup concept; the ESS that codifies French approaches (e.g. multilateralism and 
wide commitment); and co-initiated the European Gendarmerie Force (Major & 
Mölling 2007). France was opposed to expanding QMV, enhancing Parliamentary 
oversight and increasing the Commissions role; considering these changes as inefficient 
or infringements on sovereignty (Major & Mölling 2007). No development in 
ESDP/CFSP has been neither contrary not fully incompatible with French preferences; 
there has been no move towards a federalist orientation, no anti-nuclear clause nor a 
purely civilian orientation (Irondelle 2008: 160). By conceiving and placing itself as the 
leader of a politico-military Europe, France has created a frame in which it can embed 
its international role and exert influence. Although there has been a period of malaise in 
the relations between France and the EU, signified by the 2005 ´No` vote on the 
Constitution Treaty, return to national involvement in crises, reluctant attitude towards 
successive enlargements and the growing understanding other member states do not 
share their views on role and capabilities of the EU (Irondelle 2008). French 
commitment has been revitalized, as expressed with the 2013 White Paper. 
 
3.4. France and Africa – Continued Interest and a Source of Power 
 
The 2008 Paper on Defence in Chapter 6 widens the geographic strategic area of 
interest, reaching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Eastern part of the European Continent and covers the prospect of major conflict in 
Asia. The 2013 White Paper has increased the focus on Africa with the Sahel as one of 
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the focal points, links the instability of the region with risks to Europe, illustrating the 
point with the situation in Mali, while recognizing that others in Europe may not share 
the interest or assign priority to the region links the instability of the region with risks to 
Europe. 
 
Close Post-Colonial Relations. Postcolonial relations between France and North Africa, 
the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa have been characterized by close economic 
ties, military assistance and direct intervention that mix business, politics and security 
concerns. They have considered Francophone Africa a pré carré francais (a privileged 
reserve), signifying both a political symbol and an ideology that allows for developing 
African resources for French benefit (Bowen 2005: 102; Charbonneau 2008). With the 
French African policy underpinned by a Left-Right agreement that supported 
maintaining a sphere of influence in the region with the aim of bolstering its status in 
the world (French world power and its power in Africa were interlinked and mutually 
confirming) and preserving its commercial interests. The overall policy-making 
structures have been dominated by the president and with limited accountability to 
Parliament or civil society (Cumming 2013:26; Charbonneau 2008). This in turn has led 
to France signing defence agreements with eight and missions or bases in seven of its 
former colonies, together with military assistance agreements with 24 African states and 
around 30 military interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 30 year period of 1960-
1989 (Cumming 2013:26). These interventions have tended to be concentrated in or 
near the territory of its former colonial empire and carried out under Gaullist and 
Socialist governments alike, although the stated reasons for intervention have changed 
over the years, from treaty obligations, the need to protect citizens to human rights 
protection (Bell 2014). As well as networks of contacts between officials, businessmen 
and operatives, supporting African (authoritarian) regimes and distinctive bilateral 
development aid system (Cumming 2013). As also noted by Cumming (2013:40) when 
looking at French approaches and responses they are influenced by “the fact that Africa 
is often as much a domestic as a foreign policy issue in France.”   
This distinctive and neo-colonial approach and its underlying logic saw changes 
towards normalization or readjustments from 1990 onwards, especially after the 
genocide in Rwanda; with public awareness of the questionable practises rising, in 1990 
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President Francois Mitterrand declared a change in Africa policy that would make 
assistance to countries conditional on democracy and good governance. Two years later 
the shift was towards wider disengagement, pointedly demonstrated in 1999 when 
France did not intervene in Côte d'Ivoire (Bowen 2005: 102; Charbonneau 2008). The 
retrenchment included the closure of two of its seven military bases, reducing of troop 
strength by 20 per cent, reduction of Peace Corps-like volunteers and a 75 per cent 
reduction in the number of visas accorded to African nationals, characterized by a 
doctrine of ´neither interference nor indifference` (Bowen 2005: 102; Cumming 
2013:26).  However, this was also influenced by the wider reorganization and 
professionalization of the French army. Underlying continuities, between 1997 and 
2002 France launched 33 operations in Africa, out of which ten were either mandated or 
under UN command (Charbonneau 2008: 283). 
 
Change in Discourse. Since 2002 there has been a renewed French engagement in North 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, with assuming a markedly more interventionist role in Cote 
d´Ivoire, with a discourse of participating in African stability and prosperity within 
wider security policy directions of multilateralism, regionalism, and African ownership, 
meaning legitimizing its operations through regional African organizations, EU or UN 
(Ulriksen et al 2004). Concomitantly with wider trends towards prescribing to security-
development nexus, wherein security and development are co-dependent and 
necessitating one another, France modified its military approach to serve the objectives 
of global governance (Charbonneau 2008).  
In 2003, when addressing the National Assembly, the Foreign Minister Dominique de 
Villepin defined French commitment to Africa as stemming from: urgency of the 
situations there (in terms of conflict), the potential of the continent (young labour force, 
economic growth), and as a window of opportunity for France (broadening horizons, 
place for action); once again placed in frames of legitimacy and human rights, regional 
stability and African mediation. The view is summarized by his statement that “[o]ur 
policy is translated into action every time, in military terms when necessary, in the form 
of a strong and long-term political commitment designed to mobilize the international 
community in the service of peace and development” (de Villepin 2003). Notably, under 
President Chirac France`s African military missions were partly Europeanized 
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(Cumming 2013), with France instrumentalizing the EU in order to legitimize and offer 
support to its interests in Africa, as illustrated by various ESDP missions.  
As discussed by Charbonneau (2008: 288) “France‟s imagined political geographies of 
itself, Europe, and Africa are intimately intertwined and informed by its extensive 
colonial and postcolonial experiences.” The following, Sarkozy presidency was 
characterized by initial reform plans and impulses, with changes made that nonetheless 
were marked by both continuity of past practices and confusion in direction (Cumming 
2013). The influential factors were both external (increase in EU involvement, Arab 
Spring, African rejection of French approaches) and domestic pressures in the form of 
civil society and journalists (Oxfam France and ONE launched campaigns and the latter 
wrote several books exposing French practices), combined with budgetary constraints. 
Countervailing forces comprising of French business lobby with competitive advantages 
in Africa and opportunities to spread costs of existing approaches through the EU in 
both civilian and military missions, together with overriding critical African voices and 
the limited accountability to the Parliament coupled with a preoccupation with the 
financial crisis lessening the domestic impact prevailed in influencing overall policy-
making (Cumming 2013).  
With extensive strategic and economic interests in Africa, for instance the continent 
remains an important market for French manufactures, as many as 240,000 French 
citizens live there, it depends in part on African uranium, and there is an affinity for 
groups that have embraced French culture, religion and language (Bell 2014). 
Furthermore, the French public has a history of supporting military operations in Africa, 
coupled with strong support for ESDP/CSDP. After the disintegration of its empire they 
signalled the continuity in its great-power status, presently the support is bound with 
pride in defending humanitarian principles, supported by the limited mandate, scale and 
risk of the operations (Bell 2014; Irondelle 2008). 
 
On the one hand, given the deep strategic and economic ties to Africa, France (as well 
as the UK and Belgium) has learnt that operating under the rubric of multilateralism, 
makes it possible to retain influence in Africa (Rye Olsen 2009). Since, for the member 
states, the Union as a whole can provide political cover and legitimacy. The EU as a 
collective is greater than the sum of its parts. For instance, lessening or neutralizing the 
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problems that would arise when acting individually in parts of the world where some 
member states have considerable historical baggage (Menon 2009: 240). On the other, 
the so-called new threats affect Europe as a whole, with conflicts and crises in Africa 
can have negative effects in Europe, thus interventions at the source become the first 
line of defence and acting as a collective mitigates the costs of intervention 
(Charbonneau 2008). Even though, there is a fundamental divergence between EU 
member states about the former ESDP, current CFSP and use of force - in opposition to 
the French view of European security policy as stronger and wider reaching, most other 
states understand it less as a tool of coercion as a means to manage crises by allowing 
the EU to initiate and shoulder peacekeeping and stabilization missions - commonalities 
can be found and consensus reached in cases where there is a (highly mediatized or 
prominent) humanitarian or responsibility to protect impetus to intervention (Irondelle 
2008: 156). Buttressing the EU capacities, in legal, material and normative terms, has 
opened up an avenue for pursuing national policy goals that otherwise would for various 
reasons be unreachable when acting alone as well as broadening and deepening the 
EU`s security paradigm and international role together with solidifying the CSDP 
(Major & Mölling 2007); enhancing the prestige of the Union by showing that it is a 
capable, responsible and independent actor. This pattern of French activism, 
humanitarian justification, limited mandates due to management of disparate views and 
UN authorization is illustrated by the operationalization the CSDP in several military 
missions in Africa. 
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4. European Union Military Missions in Africa 
 
In devising a functioning policy area, member states faced two institutional challenges: 
to excogitate a framework that would allow for rapid and effective collective decision 
making, and secondly to see if it is practicable (Howorth 2007). Although the EU aims 
for a comprehensive approach, it has not developed a single model for missions, leaving 
a considerable degree of flexibility for individual mission planning and execution 
(Smith 2012).  
Therefore, the EU is considerably more active, both with actions and resources, in 
devoting diplomatic, aid and other civilian efforts in far more countries than it is with 
principally military methods. Its resources for development assistance and external trade 
are substantial, while in conducting military crisis management the bulk of the costs are 
carried by participating states (Bailes 2008). Therefore, hitherto the EU`s missions, 
according to Bailes & Cottey (2010: 165-166) have roughly fallen into three categories: 
major efforts in the Balkans; moderately risky albeit limited missions in developing 
regions; and small, specialized, low-risk missions in neighbouring areas. As of March 
2014 the EU has completed 19 missions: eight missions in Africa, nine in the 
Balkans/Caucasus region, one in Asia and one in the Middle East. Out of the 19 five 
were military operations (Artemis DRC, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad/CAR, and 
Concordia fYROM; in addition EUFOR Libya was not launched). The other 14 are 
civilian in character and include rule-of-law missions, monitoring missions, and 
technical aid missions (ISIS Europe 2014). And as of March 2014 there are 16 active 
CSDP and EU missions out of which nine are conducted in Africa, four in the 
Balkans/Caucasus region and three in the Middle East. Out of the 16, three are military 
operations (EUNAFOR Atalanta, EUFOR RCA in Africa and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) (ibid.). The most significant cluster of activity covering near the full 
spectrum of prescribed civilian and military operations has focused on Africa. As a as a 
theatre of operations and the sole location for distinctive application of CSDP, it has 
modelled the policy`s operational practices as well as remit; Artemis as the first non-
Berlin Plus operation, EUNAFOR Atalanta as the first naval operation; Chad/CAR as a 
bridging operation for the UN (Whitman 2013).  
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4.1. 2003 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
 
Mandate. The whole of African Great Lakes region and in particular the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) has been characterized and troubled by a mixture of political 
instability, civil wars, proxy wars and inter-state conflict. The faltering peace process in 
the DRC deteriorated in 2003, prompting the EU Council of Ministers into launching 
Operation Artemis with the aim of preventing a large-scale humanitarian crisis in the 
north-east of the country. It was the first mission undertaken within the framework of 
ESDP that took place outside of EU´s immediate neighbourhood, creating a precedent 
by extending the ESDP remit to Africa, and the first that did not use NATO assets. 
Instead the EU acted in response to the request made by the UN (Helly 2009a). The 
duration of the mission was delimited from the onset, lasting from 12 June to 1 
September 2003, when full responsibility was transferred back to MONUC. The 
common costs budget was €7 million and the mission focused on the town of Bunia 
(eastern DRC). Overall 14 member states and three third countries contributed troops to 
the approximately 2,000 strong force (Helly 2009a: 181). The mission`s mandate, 
derived from the UN SC Resolution 1484 (2003) and was “to contribute to the 
stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian 
situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced 
persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety 
of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in 
the town” (filling the security vacuum, providing the UN with room to reinforce its 
troops). 
 
A French Mission. France acted as the framework nation; moreover, it started planning 
for the operation at least a month before the EU Council had formally launched the 
mission (Ulriksen et al 2004: 521). The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appealed 
first to Javier Solana to build support among the EU defence ministers and then to the 
French President Jacques Chirac with a request for assistance in May 2003, since the 
UN force on the ground was both insufficient in size and capacity. In effect, there were 
two parallel lines opened in advocating for intervention. The French offered to send 
personnel on certain conditions (robust mandate, limited timeframe and scope, 
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agreement from the host country), agreed to act as the lead country, in addition to 
sending a draft resolution to the UN SC (Morsut 2010; Koenig 2012). After 
multinationalizing the initial operation within the framework of ESDP, France was the 
main contributor of the forces (1,785 of which 1,651 were deployed, 42 stationed at the 
OHQ and 92 in the FHQ) overall providing 90 per cent of the ground forces, the 
Operation Headquarter (OHQ) was located in Paris (staffed with around 80 officers, 40 
per cent of whom were non-French), it also provided the main air strike capabilities, 
also both the force commander and the operation commander were French (Giegrich 
2008: 29; Helly 2009a: 183; Knutsen 2009: 448; Chafer & Cumming 2010: 1134). 
Sweden was the only other country that provided combat troops (around 70-80 in 
special-forces) operating in Brunia. Belgium contributed approximately 48 people for 
medical staff and tactical and strategic aircrafts based in Uganda, the UK had around 85 
support personnel in Bunia and Uganda; and Germany provided approximately 350 
troops stationed in Uganda, tasked with medical and logistical assistance. With a small 
national numbers, Austria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain provided assistance at the OHQ (Hendrickson et al 2007; Helly 2009a: 183). 
Pushed by Sweden and the UK, changes had to be made to the initial operations plan, to 
include guarantees on issues like addressing the subject of child solders (Faria 2004). 
 
Convergence of Interests. The launch of Artemis can be attributed to the interests of 
France and the UK (Rye Olsen 2009: 251). In the context of the controversial 2003 Iraq 
war and the resultant divisions in Europe (especially between France and the UK), the 
mission was a way to show cooperation and to reinforce the idea of European unity and 
international power. In addition, the former, under President Jacques Chirac – although 
in military terms the circumstances would have allowed it to act alone (Ulriksen et al 
2004) - ´found it pertinent for the EU to prove that it could act autonomously form 
NATO` thus strategically Europeanising the initial Interim Emergency Multinational 
Force from a unilateral French intervention to an ESDP one (Rye Olsen 2009: 251; 
Ulriksen et al 2004), having also expressed desire for a more pro-active EU in African 
peacekeeping earlier in the year at the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet (Mace 
2003: 5) and advocating for a stronger ESDP during the so-called ´Chocolate Summit` 
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few months prior (Major & Mölling 2007); while London was interested in developing 
a European defence dimension and EU`s role in Africa (Rye Olsen 2009: 251).  
The opinions and official rhetoric expressed by French leadership reflected the 
mission`s focus on Europe with “the overwhelming balance of interpretation focused on 
the significance of the operation in the European framework” and far less humanitarian 
concerns (Utley 2006: 35). As further quoted and exemplified in Utley (2006: 35) 
Artemis was in Jacques Chirac`s view “„an exemplary operation ... the first major 
operation conducted in the framework of the European Union, and as such cement[ing] 
the significant advances of European defence in which the French armed forces play[ed] 
a significant role‟”; the view of the Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin was that of 
“the force in Ituri, the European Union‟s first operation outside Europe ...[was] certainly 
a very strong symbol”; Pierre-Andre´ Wiltzer Minister of Francophonie and 
Cooperation thought that this was “an important stage in the confirmation of the 
European Security and Defence Policy”; and in the words of the Defence Minister 
Alliot-Marie the “mission [was] historic because it [was] the first autonomous mission 
of the European Union ... the moment of the real creation of European defence” (Utley 
2006: 35). 
Fostered by the relative lack of political sensibility attributed the area by the United 
States and NATO. For France additional set of motivations was to avoid another failure 
after Rwanda, to maintain its zone of influence (DRC is French-speaking) and enhance 
its prestige by initiating and conducting the mission (Gegout 2010: 130). The costs for 
the UK were minimal, out of 85 troops deployed 70 were engineers who upgraded the 
airfield (Gegout 2010: 131). As such, the UK was immediately in favour, while German 
initial reluctance - faced with French and British insistence - was quickly amended and 
other member states doubts that ESDP was not yet ready to address a situation as 
unstable as that in the DRC were reassured by the limited mandate, thus none expressed 
opposition (Faria 2004: 47; Ulriksen et al 2004). 
Artemis succeeded in deploying troops to a remote operating theatre (over 6000 
kilometres from Brussels); it had the capacity to protect civilians in its area, and offered 
a chance for closer coordination with humanitarian actors and other international 
organizations on the field (Helly 2009a: 183-184). Basing their judgement on modest 
criteria of fulfilling the limited mandate and ´testing the machinery` of ESDP the 
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European policy-makers judged the mission a success; the opposing view, shared by the 
International Crisis Group and a number of NGOs found the mission insufficient to 
foster change in the situation in the region and precisely criticized the limitedness of the 
mandate (Youngs 2004: 318; Ulriksen et al 2004). As discussed by Morsut (2010: 168), 
the EU had the necessary political will to act relatively rapidly and without delay, 
within a month the Council was able to approve two Common Positions and a decision 
to launch the mission, with forces on the ground 7 days later and full deployment was 
reached within three weeks from the start date. In the aftermath of the disagreement 
over Iraq there was a general consensus and unity among the 15 member states, coupled 
with the relatively low risk and France carrying the majority of the costs, thus allowing 
for the mitigation of both operational weaknesses and institutional constrains. 
 
4.2. 2006 EUFOR in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
Mandate. Three years later in 2006, after a partial breakthrough in the peace process and 
a transitional period, planning and conducting democratic elections in the DRC was 
made possible. Since the elections would change the balance of political power, and due 
to the slow demobilization process the candidates controlled armed troops, there were 
fears of renewed violence. The UN contingent was once again overstretched and 
relatively small, prompting the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in preparation, to ask 
for more troops from the SC. After negative replies, the UN turned to the EU asking for 
a support mission (Tull 2009: 46). In December 2005 the EU received a formal request 
from the UN for assistance in securing the elections in DRC taking place on 30 July 
2006 (Knutsen 2009: 450). The source of the request created the first point of 
contestation, since the head of the UN peacekeeping department was a French diplomat 
and the informal channels prior to request were bypassed, the view among German 
officials was that of French initiative (de Flers et al 2011: 174). 
After a fact-finding mission in January, the Council adopted Joint Action 
2006/319/CFSP of April 2006 launching EUFOR RD Congo. The mission was 
mandated by the UNSC Resolution 1671 (2006) to support the UN mission (MONUC) 
in its stabilizing role, to protect civilians in the areas of deployment, to protect the 
airport, to act as deterrence and to execute evacuation operations. The length of the 
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mission was four months, from 30 July to November 2006. The JA set the common 
costs for the period at €16.7 million (not covering barracks and lodging for the forces 
and expenditure relating to their transport) (Major 2009: 315). The overall cost of 
EUFOR was about €100 million, with the common costs rising to approximately €23 
million. Out of the remaining expenditure France contributed approx. €27 million and 
Germany around €26 million (Major 2009: 315). Furthermore, in addition to Artemis 
(2003), the EU has deployed three civilian missions focusing on security sector reform 
to Congo. EUPOL Kinshasa 2005-2007 followed by EUPOL RD Congo since 2007 and 
EUSEC RD Congo since 2005 (ISIS Europe 2014).   
 
Effective Multilateralism. France, Belgium and the European Commission argued for 
the mission. The former two had national interests in keeping DRC stable, with France 
having a longstanding involvement in the region and in the peace process, as 
exemplified by and congruent with the previous EU mission. There was also a 
perceived need to assert credibility and unity in the wake of the no-votes for the 
Constitutional Treaty in Ireland, France and the Netherlands; together with the backdrop 
of the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa in 2005 for which the mission was a test 
case (Chafer & Cumming 2010: 1135). Illustrated by an article published in the “Le 
Monde” newspaper in 3rd June 2006, wherein the French Minister of Defence, Michèle 
Alliot-Marie, put the context of the mission as a public desire that EU is actively 
pursuing “[a]ccording to a recent survey, 80% of Europeans would like our continent to 
have the capacity to deploy its defence forces independently of the United States. 
Without them necessarily realizing it, this wish is becoming a reality…and it continues 
to make headway despite the difficulties resulting from the rejection of the European 
Constitutional Treaty last year”. For the EU, as discussed by Gross (2009: 57) “as far as 
the ESDP EUFOR RD Congo was concerned, this was about EU–UN cooperation and 
implementing “effective multilateralism” more so than a debate over the 
appropriateness of an ESDP operation in this particular geographic region”.  
 
German Involvement. Even though France had an interest in the mission, they had led 
the previous operation and so to add credibility, France asked Germany to play the 
leading role (de Flers et al 2011). During the Franco-German Summit in January 2006, 
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Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Jacques Chirac had indicated that each would 
provide one third of the soldiers. Facing domestic scepticism and feeling pressured by 
France, together with participation under the „costs lie where they fall‟ principle raising 
fears of paying for the majority of the mission, Germany remained reluctant (ibid.). 
Despite the French suggestion, it was unwilling to deploy the Franco-German Battle 
Group which primarily comprised of German troops (Gross 2009). But, it was one of 
the few member states with a functioning OHQ; the UK although politically not 
opposed to the missions objectives and was giving financial support to the peace-
process, was overstretched with commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and perceived it 
as a hard sell domestically, had declined the role (Gross 2009: 88). Since Germany had 
a normative commitment to EU-level cooperation and the ESDP project, Berlin was 
willing to negotiate, setting preconditions that had to be met. After negotiations and 
pressure form EU pro-mission countries, notably France, and concern over non-
participation would hurt the credibility of the ESDP Germany consented (Tull 2009: 49; 
de Flers et al 2011). The OHQ was thus led by Germany and located in Potsdam and the 
FHQ was run by France and located in Kinshasa (Knutsen 2009: 451). After requests in 
the PSC, followed by internal discussions and a conversation between the Polish 
President and the President of France and motivated by reputation-building and political 
investment, Poland agreed to send 130 military police (de Flers et al 2011). These 
discussions and negotiations continuously delayed deployment. Therefore, in contrast to 
the previous mission, it took the EU almost three months to give an affirmative answer 
to the UN and six months for the force to be operational (Rodt 2011: 50-51). 
Altogether, twenty-one EU member states along with Turkey and Switzerland 
contributed. The peak strength was 2,466 troops. France deployed 1,090, Germany 730, 
Poland 130 and Spain 130, with special forces provided by France, Sweden and 
Portugal (Giegrich 2008: 30; Major 2009: 314). The troops were deployed in three 
locations: an advanced element of around 1,425 in Kinshasa, on call force of over 800 
in Libreville, Gabon at a French military base and a strategic reserve in Europe (France 
and Germany), thus bringing the troop size to around 4,000. The Spanish unit of 130 
soldiers was the only effective fighting force in Kinshasa, the Polish 130 military police 
protected the EUFOR facilities and the rest had support functions, including intelligence 
and medical services (Tull 2009: 50).  After reaching a deal at the EU level, the German 
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Government had faced domestic negotiations. In the Government itself there were 
disagreements, with the Ministry of Defence and armed forces against the mission as 
such and the Chancellor and the Minister of Cooperation and Development supporting it 
with the difference being in the size and modalities; the debate justifying it was over the 
centrality and importance of multilateralism and the lack of strategic concept towards 
Africa (de Flers et al 2011: 176; Gross 2009; 150-151). As a result, the German 
Bundestag placed geographical restrictions on the positioning of German troops in 
DRC; correspondingly to the limits on the Spanish contingent, circumscribing them to 
Kinshasa. Moreover, the German combat troops were stationed in Gabon, limiting their 
utility and operationalization (Knutsen 2009: 451; Major 2009: 315-316). In sum, 
France provided the majority of the troops in the primary operating theatre and 
moreover, considerable share of EU troops were placed outside of DRC. 
 
Since the operation was temporally limited to the end of November, but the second 
round of elections was delayed, with the results announced not until 29 October or a 
few days before the mandate ended, France and Belgium wanted to extend the mission 
as a precaution, to address the danger of renewed conflict breaking out. Germany 
opposed this plan, in part because the Defence Minister had publicly promised to bring 
the troops home for Christmas (ibid.). Refusing the extension contradicted the mission 
objectives, since the initial fear was of violence caused by dissatisfaction with the 
results. Instead, the EU risked outbreak of conflict right when it was withdrawing (Tull 
2009: 53). As argued by Gegout (2010: 132) “Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD 
Congo were conducted because a humanitarian mission was necessary, but this was not 
a sufficient reason in itself. In fact, when other humanitarian missions could have been 
conducted in the DRC, the EU was not present.” Since the mission was limited in time 
and scope with success consisting of fulfilling its limited mandate EUFOR DRC did not 
contribute in regard to managing the conflict as a whole. It did not prevent more 
violence in the country, the conflict continued and the situation remained volatile (Rodt 
2011). 
 
Non-Mission to DRC in 2008. In 2008 the situation in the DRC had deteriorated once 
again to a point of reaching a severe humanitarian crisis. In October 2008 following a 
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EU foreign ministers meeting, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, called the 
situation in DRC “unacceptable and murderous” (Vines 2011: 57). At their next meeting 
in November, DRC had moved to the top of the agenda, but concluded with a call to 
reinforce cooperation between actors involved. While using force was not ruled out, the 
EU was not united either. Kouchner discussed using the EU Battlegroups and called for 
EU military intervention, that idea was rejected by HR Solana, but in general French 
position was more towards giving humanitarian aid and supporting MONUC. When 
drawing parallels between using force with Artemis and the situation at hand in 2008, 
Foreign Minister Kouchner highlighted the complexity of the crisis, the lack of a 
specific goal and timeframe together with a need for a political solution as reasons for 
general reluctance and impetus to find alternative methods (Kouchner 2008). Faced with 
reluctance from the UK and Germany, various NGOs and public figures lobbied the EU 
governments for an intervention (Pohl 2013b; Vines 2011: 57). After the UN SC passed 
a resolution allowing for additional troops, in December 2008, the UN Secretary-
General explicitly requested military support from the EU to act as a bridging force 
prior to MONUC reinforcement. Germany rejected the mission outright, unwilling to 
take part in another African mission with potential domestic costs coupled with a 
slowdown in its economy; the UK was more cautious in part due to media pressure to 
act on one hand but on the other there was strong concerns in the Ministry of Defence 
about military overstretch stemming from Afghanistan commitments; Spain and Italy 
cited inability to lead, as did the Netherlands (offered funds only): while Belgium due to 
the strong domestic public pressure was the biggest advocate. While the French foreign 
minister supported action, the rest of the administration had a more negative stance with 
the military doubting the feasibility of the mission (Pohl 2013b: Vines 2011: 57). On 6
th
 
December 2008, in a joint article in ´Le Monde`, French foreign minister Kouchner and 
British foreign secretary David Miliband clearly stated that “fundamentally the situation 
in Congo can only be resolved by political means: there will be no military solution to 
this problem”. In sum, due to opposition, strong preference for civilian response and 
without a lead nation, the UN request was rejected.   
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4.3. 2008 EUFOR Chad and Central African Republic 
 
Crisis in Darfur. The situation in Darfur that broke out in 2003 was on paper exactly the 
sort of mission the ESDP was created to undertake. It fell within the confines of 
purportedly acceptable use of force – a failed state where crisis management is needed 
to restore order and to protect civilians on humanitarian grounds. Furthermore, it would 
not have offered a clear benefit to any single member state (Toje 2008: 135). The UN 
SG Kofi Annan told the international community in April 2004 to be prepared to take 
measures in Darfur; the President of the EU`s military committee declared that the EU 
had the means to intervene; the UK seemed prepared to send troops. When none of the 
others were able or willing, since Germany together with some smaller states looked for 
non-military measures, and fearing bearing a large share of the burden without a 
likelihood of minimal national gain, France signalled an opposition to a military mission 
as well (Toje 2008: 136). In an interview to ´Paris Match` Foreign Minister Michel 
Barnier on 5
th
 August 2004 spoke about need to give support to humanitarian 
organizations and the AU and put political pressure (in effect advocating for a political 
solution) on Sudan with an overall need of a common EU foreign policy for the region 
and to ´Le Monde` a few days later on 8th August Barnier (2004b) stated that “a 
definitive resolution of this crisis can be achieved only by supporting the Africans‟ own 
efforts”. In addition France did not wish to jeopardise relations with the Arab world 
after the French opposition to the Iraq war. As well as being opposed to NATO being 
involved, stressing that it is not NATO`s role to be a police officer – concerned that 
NATO would expand its interests to Francophone Africa. (Gegout 2010: 132). The EU 
hoped that other actors would take the lead (the United States, Britain, the UN or 
NATO) and they could engage selectively form the fringes. By the end of 2004 the 
situation in Darfur had deteriorated to a point where accumulating pressure on the EU 
was close to a critical mass for an ESDP mission. The UK as a vocal advocate started 
planning for a unilateral intervention in July 2004, only to conclude a lack of military 
capabilities (Toje 2008: 137). As such the EU leaders lacked the necessary political will 
to act decisively, opting for discussions on the nature of the particular conflict, issuing 
declarations and statements, using financial aid, supporting regional organizations 
active in the area, without getting militarily involved (ibid.). 
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Chad as a Substitute. The conflict in Chad is closely linked with the conflict in Darfur. 
The latter has resulted in an outpouring of refugees together with internally displaced 
people meeting at the porous border areas between eastern Chad and Darfur, resulting in 
no secure environments to escape to from internal armed conflict and inter-ethnic 
violence, in addition to the proxy-war between Sudan and Chad. In 2006, the UK and 
France requested the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to start 
planning for an international presence (Dijkstra 2010; 397). The situation in Darfur was 
by then high on the domestic political agenda in France, influenced by the presidential 
elections in 2007. The newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner had during campaigning made a pledge to ´do something 
about Darfur,` coupled with domestic pressure from both the civil society as well as 
from media personalities, creating substantial expectations for the incoming 
administration (Pohl 2013b: 7). Sudan on the other hand would not allow for Western 
troops to participate in international operation, moreover the presence of the AU and the 
UN was on a precarious footing (Styan 2012). Further impetus was found with 
refocusing on the humanitarian situation in Chad with Mr Kouchner discussing various 
options, communicating with the EU and persistently working towards an intervention, 
since the EU partners were sceptical, deriving from the their suspicions of France 
pursuing its interest in its former colonial areas and fears of public backlash over 
intervening in an relatively unknown situation (Pohl 2013b). Germany, holding the 
rotating EU presidency, tried to focus on other priorities. With the transfer of the 
presidency to Portugal in July 2007, the plans for intervention were revived, supported 
by the Council Secretariat. During the planning stages, the geographical focus shifted 
squarely on eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR and discarding other more ambitious 
options (no fly zones, humanitarian corridors) on supporting the activities of the UN. 
France volunteered as the Framework nation, offered to provide 40 per cent of the 
troops and the OHQ for the mission (Dijkstra 2010; 397-398). One of the selling points 
for other member states was framing the mission as a bridging operation; the EU force 
would serve until a UN peacekeeping mission could take over.  
In October 2007 the EU military operation EUFOR Chad/CAR was established; 
mandated to act complementarily to the UN Mission to Chad and CAR (MINURCAT) 
with a threefold objective: to protect civilians (in particular refugees and IDPs), to 
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facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian 
workers, and to contribute to the protection of UN personnel and property (Helly 2009b: 
339). The mission lasted from 15 March 2008 to 15 March 2009 (ibid.). 
 
Difficulties in Mission Forming. In contrast to previous missions in the DRC, EUFOR 
Chad/CAR was a contentious mission from the onset within the EU. The countries were 
both former French colonies that have close political and military ties with France. 
France has had a military base in Chad since the mid-1980`s with around 3,000 troops 
being stationed there to buttress the government and stabilize the situation (Rye Olsen 
2009: 255). Besides the rebels in Chad (France was supporting the Chadian regime), 
some French NGO`s expressed concern about the agenda motivating the intervention; 
and according to Rye Olsen (2009: 55) there was ´a general agreement among observers 
and EU civil servants in Brussels that France played a remarkably strong role`, resulting 
in widespread criticism of the mission form several fronts. Although, Germany and the 
UK did not block the mission, they also did not contribute any troops and wished to 
keep common costs low. Germany having taken the lead in the previous mission to the 
DRC, after international pressure and domestic negotiations, opted out seeing no part 
for itself in Africa (de Flers et al 2011; Pohl 2013b). The UK was primarily concerned 
with Darfur, but also saw a danger of a regional conflict erupting; the Foreign Office 
was ready for the latter scenario, while the Ministry of Defence remained cautious with 
both refusing to participate and blocking funding. After an exchange between President 
Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown did the UK send four staff officers, unblocked the 
money and - prompted by domestic public concern, pressure from British NGOs and the 
US administrations concern over the situation in Darfur- co-sponsored the UN-
resolution authorizing the deployment (Chafee and Cumming 2010: 1136). During the 
Council Secretariat planning process, member states did not explicitly state their 
agreement for a military operation in Chad. Instead, informal decisions, led by France, 
took place. Since, Germany and the UK were not willing to deploy troops; France 
worked to get other member states to contribute, using the position of operation 
commander as a bargaining device. Even though Sweden showed initial interest, after a 
visit to the region, the Swedish Foreign Mister Carl Bildt announced that they would not 
be deploying the Swedish-led Nordic Battle Group (Dijkstra 2010: 398). The position of 
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operation commander was offered to Ireland during an informal defence ministers 
meeting. For the Irish government it was a way to illustrate its commitment to the UN-
system and humanitarian purposes while gaining credibility in EU-matters after the lost 
referendum (Pohl 2013b). Along with filling the post, Ireland provided 450 troops. 
President Sarkozy`s diplomacy also had a success with Poland, which offered 400 
troops. Other member states (all but Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Malta) made smaller 
contributions (Dijkstra 2010: 400; Styan 2012: 659). As stated by Pohl (2013: 8b) one 
of the primary reasons for not blocking the mission, was operating in the spirit of quid 
pro quo, meaning the unwillingness of governments to outright oppose another member 
states pet project when possible. The UK remained passive throughout the negotiation 
and deployment processes. As interpreted by Rye Olsen (2009: 255) there is a division 
of labour in Africa, whereby the UK and France would respect each other‟s interests 
and activities, keeping a low profile when necessary. Since the prevalence of France and 
the ambiguous rationale behind the mission, some member states (Austria, Finland, 
Sweden, Ireland) with the interest in acting in the region in accordance with an 
humanitarian agenda (motivated by domestic political interests) and supporting ESDP, 
insisted on the missions impartiality (Helly 2009b: 346; Pohl 2013b: 10). As such the 
EUFOR mandate excluded any political role, the mission was deemed to be strictly 
neutral (Styan 2012: 661). 
Adding to the discord, during the drafting of the Joint Action the amount of common 
costs significantly increased. The initial estimate of €420 million was negotiated down 
to €99.2 million. A sum that Germany and the UK had agreed to; the revised proposal 
with an increase to €120 million led to disputes (Dijkstra 2010: 399). The combined 
total costs of the mission were approximately €1 billion; since the amount of the 
common costs was restricted, France as the largest troop contributor ended up with 
footing the majority of the bill (Helly 2009b: 342) After four force generation 
conferences, there was still a shortage of military hardware and other logistical support 
(mainly military transport helicopters and medical facilities). During the fifth and final 
conference, France decided to make up most of the shortfalls, the troop increases were 
made by transferring some of the troops from the French 1200-strong Epervier force in 
Chad under EU control. After lobbying, Russian Federation contributed four helicopters 
at a later date (Dijkstra 2010: 400; Styan 2012). The problems with troop commitments, 
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inadequate equipment and budgeting disputes delayed the formation of the mission by 
several months.  
 
Reasons for consent have been attributed to the frustration and pressure to act in the 
situation in Darfur with Chad as an opportunity to something under the banner of 
humanitarian aid, while demonstrating the utility of ESDP in the field of peacekeeping, 
to the binding/bridging character of the mission with a clear time frame of one year, and 
it had – due to French lobbying - a wider range of contributors than previous missions 
in Africa (including among third states) (Rye Olsen 2009: 255). Like the 
aforementioned missions, EUFOR Chad/CAR did have some success in alleviating the 
violence even though similarly to EUFOR DRC the deployment was delayed, they were 
not authorized to provide security within the camps and were stopped from operating at 
the border area, together with an overall limited placement and lack of support from 
domestic, regional, European and international actors. Hence it had little overall impact 
on conflict management in Chad and the region, besides improving the security 
situation at the operation area (Rodt 2011: 53-54). Furthermore, due to the limited 
mandate, the mission had no effect on the situation in Darfur. 
 
4.4. 2008 EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta 
 
Acts of piracy - arising from the general instability and lack of effective state apparatus 
in Somalia for more than two decades - had been reported off the Somali coast and 
around the Horn of Africa prior to 2007 (Larik 2013). But, following the increase in 
number and intensity of acts in 2007 and 2008, including those on World Food 
Programme (WFP) vessels that were delivering humanitarian aid, the UNSC passed 
several resolutions to address the problem in the region. The French-US supported 
Resolution 1816 permitting according to international law ´all necessary means to 
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery´. Concomitantly, at first, various states 
(Canada, the Netherlands, France and Denmark) naval units and temporary NATO 
operation Allied Provider, were sent to the region to escort WFP vessels. (Germond & 
Smith 2009: 579; Vainio 2008). The Council established a coordination cell EU 
NAVCO (without military assets) in Brussels in September 2008, to support the anti-
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piracy efforts carried out by some of the member states. In December 2008 the EU 
launched the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation 
Atalanta – its first naval mission, to support the UN Resolutions and to contribute to the 
protection of WFP and other vulnerable vessels in the area and to the deterrence and 
repression of acts of piracy; the mandate has been amended several times adding tasks, 
widening reach and extending the duration, although no changes have been made to its 
political objectives (Ehrhart & Petretto 2012). Compared to previous two military 
missions, EU NAVFOR was launched promptly, in 10 weeks. The common costs for 
the first 12 months were €8.4 million, with total estimated annual contributions at €400 
million (Helly 2009c: 391). Atalanta was initially scheduled for one year, but its 
mandate has been extended until December 2014. Since there has been a constant 
rotation of vessels, the participation number fluctuates, but most member states have 
contributed (Larik 2013). During its initial duration, the mission operated with at least 
six warships, several reconnaissance planes and around 1,500 personnel (Weber 2009: 
73).  
 
A Set of Motives for Action. In the case of piracy there is a clearer direct threat to 
European citizens (yachters and sailors) who face the threat of kidnapping and 
ransoming. Piracy harms maritime trade, with a potentially damaging effect on 
European (and world) economy, since about 20 per cent of global trade passes through 
the Gulf of Aden, with the negative impact worsened by the soaring costs of marine 
insurance premiums - illustrated by European ship-owners lobbing EU governments for 
more forceful action - and threatening EU`s energy security as EU`s oil imports transit 
through the area. The situation has a negative influence on European fishermen and EC 
fishing vessels (primarily those of France, Italy and Spain) operating in the zone (in 
2008 the loss was estimated over € 65 million to the 43 EC vessels operating in the 
region) (Barrueco 2009: 201; Rice & Gow 2008; Helly 2009: 394). Since targeted 
vessels are mostly oil and chemical tankers, the attacks also entailed an environmental 
risk. Therefore, from an economic point of view, it has been in the EU`s collective 
interest to address the situation. In addition, due to the unstable situation in Somalia and 
Yemen, there could be a potential risk of inter-linkage between pirates and terrorist 
groups; and disrupted deliveries of humanitarian and food aid harm the Somali 
61 
  
population who depend on the WFP (a priority for the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands). The money gained and food, arms, cargo seized by the pirates support the 
local warlords, perpetuating the state of chaos (Germond & Smith 2009; Barrueco 2009: 
201; Helly 2009).  
 
Leadership and Participation. In April 2008 French President Sarkozy authorized the 
use of deadly force in response to the hijacking of Le Ponant with a Special Forces raid 
on land, and once again in September to rescue kidnaped French yachters (Germond and 
Smith 2009: 580). Between July and September France was holding the rotating EU 
Presidency, and was also the first official advocate for a military role for the EU, in part 
triggered by the high mediatisation of the aforementioned events, as stated by Foreign 
Mister Kouchner “thanks to the French European Union presidency, we launched in 
partnership with Spain the first European maritime operation” (Kouchner 2009). Giving 
the ESDP a naval dimension would work towards strengthening the policy, in addition 
France has been active in naval cooperation with other European countries outside of 
NATO (Force Navale France-Allemande and EUROMARFOR, Anglo-French 
cooperation) (Germond & Smith 2009: 584). Although France had an instrumental role 
in securing UNSC authorization for the mission and was seen as the main instigator, due 
to political considerations (having been at the forefront in the previous three missions 
and carrying a large burden with EUFOR Chad/CAR) and economic reasons (cuts in 
defence spending) it preferred not taking the leading role (Chafer & Cumming 2010: 
1137).  
German navy had been shifting towards a more interventionist character, reflected in 
doctrinal documents and in the participation in ´out of area` operations, namely the anti-
terrorist operation Enduring Freedom at the Horn of Africa, Active Endeavour in the 
Mediterranean and naval component in UNIFIL off the coast of Lebanon (Germond & 
Smith 2009: 584). Therefore, it provided one vessel straight away and has participated 
in the long term. Other considerations included safeguarding national economic 
interests (most affected by piracy) and expressing support to the EU after its troop 
reductions in the Balkans (Weber 2009). As such, the bigger issue was getting the UK 
to agree on the role for the EU in anti-piracy. Since NATO had been the only competent 
actor in naval operations and regarding NATO-ESDP/CSDP relations as a zero-sum 
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game the British government was concerned about undermining NATO`s capacities. 
However, NATO was becoming overstretched at the time with the mission in 
Afghanistan and with monitoring potential terrorist activities. The UK as a major naval 
power in its own right, with a long tradition and competence; and its shipping interest 
being affected by piracy, doing nothing or allowing France to take the lead was not 
optimal or even a preferred solution (Germond & Smith 2009: 585). Furthermore, the 
UK Government was faced with lobbying by private sector actors since London is an 
international hub for commercial shipping (Chafer & Cumming 2010: 1137). Suitably, 
during the creation of ESDP/CSDP, the UK and the United States had advocated for a 
principle of subsidiarity for EU operations, seeing it as a useful tool for when either the 
United States or NATO are not willing or able to intervene. In the case of Atalanta, this 
was put into practice since delegating the anti-piracy operation to the EU freed up the 
US to a degree and allowed NATO to focus on other issues (namely terrorism) 
(Germond & Smith 2009: 585). The UK took the lead of the operation, citing protection 
of trade and commerce and self-defence as reasons for the mission. The decision was 
also made in the context of the ten year anniversary of the St Malo declaration, an event 
that led France and the UK to emphasize their cooperation (Norton-Taylor 2008).  
 
In upholding SC Resolutions the EU had an opportunity to be a visible and responsible 
international security actor operating in a multilateral context, as well as to protect its 
economic interests and to place it within the facets of the ´comprehensive approach` 
taken to address Somali issues (Larik 2013). In terms of risk to EU forces, the mission 
involves minimal action and exposure on land, supported by the substantial power 
discrepancies between European vessels and Somali pirate skiffs (ibid.) or as put by 
Weber (2009: 71) “the endeavour was plainly feasible, useful and legitimate” serving a 
humanitarian objective as well as European trade interests, with the request coming 
from the country itself. In justifying the mission, member states put emphasis on the 
multilateral framework and protecting universal values; German foreign minister 
clarified German participation arising from a rationale of guaranteeing the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, with national-economic interests as a secondary goal within a wider 
common interest; Sweden also put the protection of WFP vessels as the main priority 
63 
  
with; Spain was more explicit in protecting both international security and national 
interests as an interlinking concern (Larik 2011: 58-59). 
Although, the mission has contributed to the considerable reduction in the number of 
attacks and succeeded in protecting WFP vessels, it has not put an end to piracy nor 
fostered a permanent and sustainable solution to underlying causes (ibid.). Moreover, 
having the EU mission has not stopped member states from operating in other 
frameworks, with countries - including Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain the UK and France – contributing to parallel missions or switching flags 
to conduct missions outside mandate purview (e.g. rescuing nationals) (Larik 2013). 
 
Following the initial active period of 2003-2008 when the EU launched 27 operations, 
the activities came to a near standstill after EUFOR Chad/CAR and Atalanta. In the 
context of the aftermath over French pressure concerning the mission in Chad and the 
financial crisis in Europe, neither new civilian nor military missions were launched 
before 2012. After a six year gap, a new EU military mission was launched in February 
2014, namely EUFOR RCA in Central African Republic (ISIS Europe 2014). 
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 Conclusions 
 
The EU is a hybrid entity with different constituent parts having various impelling 
forces for integration. When elucidating the drivers and the integration outcomes in the 
field of military aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy - its placement 
within the EU structure, shape and form as expressed in various treaties, HHGs and 
ESS, operationalization with missions – member states with their interests, goals and 
views have been paramount in broadening and deepening the security paradigm and 
architecture of the EU. The relatively rapid development of the ESDP apparatus, from 
its initiation in 1998 to creation in 1999 and acquiring a treaty base in 2001 to its first 
mission in 2003 together with treaty level new or added facets and political attention at 
Council summits to the creation of CSDP (Kaunert and Zwolski 2013) has been dictated 
by events that the member states have needed to respond to. Influenced by domestic 
public`s reactions to European discord and lack of leadership in prominent issues, 
together with views on their governments overall action or inaction and its accordance 
with their normative self-perceptions, since government actions are impacted by its 
perceptions of how a policy will affect its own power or what are its expected domestic 
political consequences (Pohl 2012a). 
Form the pre-Maastricht outbreak of the Gulf War of February-March 1991 
exemplifying a lack of unity; the situation in the former Yugoslavia triggering the whole 
CFSP to CSDP process and furthermore shadowing the Amsterdam negotiations, both 
times drawing attention to military capacity shortfalls and inadequacy of the collective 
toolbox in addressing military conflicts; changes in government, most importantly in the 
UK, allowing for closer cooperation at St Malo; the post-Nice progression shaded by 
9/11 and influencing a common security strategy that defines the role conception of the 
EU towards a non-coercive crisis manager; to the Iraq war emphasising the inherent and 
prevalent divisions in Europe. As well as being faced with budgetary constraints and 
gradual fall in defence budgets; with the United States pivot away from Europe; and the 
shift in threat perceptions, security considerations and in the normative context. Overall, 
the constant themes underlying the concept framing have been difficulties in finding a 
common approach to the situations, highlighting the divisions between Member States 
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views on projecting force, coupled with Europe`s inability as a collective to influence 
international events or to effectively partake in post-Cold War ´crisis management` 
(Menon 2004: 22; McCormick 2002).  
Coupled with the domestic interests in responding to these particular instances and 
developing a common approach altogether, has been the EU as a facilitating stage for 
negotiations setting limits in what can be achieved. Deriving from the EU`s a voluntary 
character (veto-power in the Council; states choose to join), lack of coercion, instead the 
transaction costs of bargaining are low (institutionalized system with the possibility of 
numerous offers and counteroffers), the member states operating in the system are risk-
averse and avoid high costs, and the environment is relatively information-rich 
(Moravcsik 1993). Furthermore, as discussed in the first chapter, the outcome in the 
form of the CSDP has been determined by the relative intensity of national preferences 
with the need to compromise setting the limits (Moravcsik 1993). The goal has been 
fostering coherence and a common approach to multiply power and to that end to utilize 
the EU. Due to the multiplicity of viewpoints, the mandate and resources of the CSDP 
have been contested from the onset, but throughout the institution-building process the 
preference of member states (in which they have found compromise) has been for non-
binding mechanisms that would preserve autonomy in spite of attempts towards more 
convergence; the intergovernmental and unanimity in decision-making was put in place 
with the Maastricht Treaty and has subsequently been reinforced with each new treaty 
revision. While the decision-making process that has arisen from all the institutional 
upgrades is complex, it is still based firmly on governments seeking unanimity in an 
ambiguous framework. The leitmotif has been the lack of commitment on the part of 
member states to fulfil their obligations such as the Headline Goals or utilizing 
Battlegroups, moreover the states have lowered the agreed upon goals. Although 
institutional structures for arriving at a single voice and representation have been 
created, they are made subservient to member states political will and control through, 
for instance personnel selection. Community method based EU institutions have been 
largely sidestepped, with member states having, as such, created one more option for 
force projection (allowing for forum-shopping and burden-sharing) and creating a 
scapegoat in case of unfavourable decisions or (in)actions.  
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Since the CSDP is a political and strategic project driven by converging interests the 
internal inability to agree on the overall strategic direction of external action has led to 
the CSDP missions lacking a unified framework for different stages. From planning to 
implementation, the ad hoc approach taken is “a bargaining game over the terms of co-
operation” (Moravcsik 1993: 469), exemplified by ambiguous clauses about EU 
engagement in foreign and security policy. The configuration of national preferences 
allows for an assortment of potentially viable agreements, governments need to 
collectively come to an agreement in which conflicting interest and views on 
distributional consequences are reconciled (Moravcsik 1993: 497).  
In the context of the financial crisis the costs of new military ´adventures` such as a 
proposed mission to Darfur, the UN-suggested operation in the Eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in the late 2008 or the proposed EUFOR Libya seemed relatively 
steeper with perceived domestic gain being to a smaller degree than acceptable (Pohl 
2013a: 319). The two non-interventions to Darfur in 2003 and DRC in 2008 were due to 
lack of agreement, although that obstacle can be overcome, as seen with Chad/CAR, 
either reached through acceptable contextualization (in this case acting as a proxy for 
Darfur), through political negotiations (French diplomacy) or by bigger states neither 
participating nor blocking a decision to deploy. More importantly, in these cases there 
was no strong leader willing to take on the responsibility on the one hand. On the other 
due to political and economic concerns and complexities, deriving in part from the lack 
of a clear mandate options as well as no clear option for an end-date, there was outright 
opposition and preference towards civilian means. Within the created CSDP system, no 
state can act alone or without tacit acquiescence of the big three, Germany, France and 
the UK. The national public opinion in member states is generally not in favour of 
foreign military interventions. Against the background of renewed nationalism, as is 
evident in in France, in Greece, the UK, Finland and others, it is difficult for 
governments to obtain the support of the public for increasing defence budgets, 
participation in missions or promoting defence industries (Fernandez Sola 2013). The 
most recent and to date on-going EU mission EUFOR RCA, has exemplified in its early 
stages these difficulties and followed the previously set pattern of contentious missions 
(EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad/CAR). The mission planning followed French 
lead, has a perception of this being an internal African problem and the French approach 
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to the mission has been contentious since France started on their own in 2013 and asked 
for support after the event, characterized by delays in deployment, insufficient 
commitments, and mandate that has a limited timeframe and UN-bridging aspect. 
Furthermore, the EU`s attention and diplomatic efforts have been focused to the 
situation and tensions with Russia over Ukraine (Nimark 2014; Ducrotté 2014). 
 
When looking the total number of missions and the balance between military and 
civilian orientation - despite the aim of the policy to foster military cooperation - the 
majority of CSDP missions have been civilian in nature. Such missions entail fewer 
costs, both in terms of political risk and financial means together with public support on 
´soft` security; allowing for EU governments to engage internationally without taking 
on a substantial degree of responsibility. For a mission to be authorized, in broad terms, 
first a unanimous decision is needed and second an intervention force needs to be 
organized, that means assembling a national military and civilian resources and the will 
and ability to pay for them. Therefore, military operations have been justified on 
humanitarian terms and with limited timeframes as a way to mitigate political risks 
(Pohl 2013a: 319). But, as argued by Gegout (2010) having a humanitarian crisis is not 
a sufficient trigger for EU military intervention, a mixture of low risk to European 
forces and willingness to enhance prestige and power is needed. Further arguments are 
made by Bailes (2008) stating that the EU`s missions are not chosen on purely 
principled grounds (greatest humanitarian need, benefit to the greatest number, 
conformity with the principles of ESS or the UN Charter), but can be explained in terms 
of limited risk and cost, training value, ease of consensus and demonstration of 
autonomy and ability. Therefore, none of the missions have resolved the conflicts or 
offered a long-terms solution to the situation, best exemplified by the continuous 
situation in the DRC. As stated by Toje (2008: 127) “the EU favours small-scale, low-
intensity pre-and post-crisis management in response to issues low on the international 
agenda.” Thus, the system created allows for picking and choosing issues that favour 
consensus with nothing to mandate leaders to put divisive issues on the agenda. Leading 
to inconsistencies, mere declarations on urgent crises, low level of commitment and 
applied coercive force in situations where the need for it is questionable; action 
characterized by not what is needed to meet a specific objective but what can be agreed 
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upon (Toje 2008:132).  The ´costs lie were they fall` system penalizes those who have 
capabilities during procurement and again when those capabilities are used, rewarding 
disinvestment and free-riding. In addition, it gives a far greater stay to those member 
states that are militarily stronger (ibid.). In this context, tabling a CSDP mission entails 
a twofold cost, both in immaterial terms in political capital and financially in delivering 
a substantial part of necessary capabilities. As such, Germany`s and the UK`s reluctance 
to participate in French-led military operations has been less a question of normative 
differences than about domestic political risks of participating in projects of dubious 
gain (Pohl 2013a: 319). 
 
While a moral case can be made in intervening in cases with great breaches of security 
and human rights in former colonial areas that also are arguably linked with the colonial 
heritage, on the other hand the return of European military forces can be linked to neo-
colonialism and self-serving economic interest protection (Bailes 2008: 124). 
Intervening as a collective offers a larger degree of legitimacy, on the other EU`s 
military involvement in Africa has been reluctant and has occurred at the initiative of 
France and been accompanied by internal power relations. Even though in some cases, 
such as EUFOR DRC and Atalanta, France has not taken the lead, but has worked to 
ensure the mission and provided the bulk of the troops and thus covered the largest 
share of costs. Out of the four analysed missions, Atalanta had the clearest self-interest 
and economic motive, the rest were more strongly argued as being humanitarian in 
nature, although that designation has had a questionable value. Illustrated by the first 
mission, Artemis, functioning as a unifier for the post-Iraq cleavages as well as being a 
show of power and autonomy for the nascent policy; EUFOR RCA being a French 
mission placed in an European context and although led by Germany, its forces were 
constrained in their freedom of action and geographic location, furthermore the mission 
was not prolonged even though there was potential need for it; and EUFOR Chad/CAR 
stemming from French commitments and concerns expressed during elections, with 
deployment depending on political negotiations. 
This French leadership in European security policy has a long history, starting at the 
onset of the European project, as well as being in line with French self-perceptions, 
strategic outlook and the need for avenues for power projection to multiply its global 
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power. Its security culture has seen instrumental adaptations from downsizing nuclear 
investments, increasing investments in intelligence, ending of conscription based 
military, national procurement of armaments to consolidating its permanent seat at the 
UN SC, projecting its ambitions onto the European-level and its ´light reintegration` 
into NATO (Irondelle & Besancenot 2010: 24). A strong focus has been on the EU and 
the politico-institutional CSDP building, by driving both political statements and more 
precise guides for action. Throughout the process, France has remained the leader, 
depending on the question at hand together either with Germany or the United Kingdom 
(as also underscored in the 2013 White Paper). Although France has been successful, it 
also has had to compromise on its long-term goals to reach a cooperative agreement. 
Moreover, as a nuclear power, member of all the main multilateral security institutions 
it still operates an independent foreign policy; playing on two levels without a clear 
distinction, but according to strategic need and advantage. The pragmatic choice 
between form (unilateral or bilateral or multilateral) and institution (EU, UN, NATO) is 
based on context and on the issues at hand, but overall preferring cooperation that is 
either based on a statutory hierarchy of states (e.g. UN SC) or informal ´directorates` 
(e.g. the EU-3 in negotiations with Iran)  (Irondelle 2008; Irondelle & Besancenot 
2010). Presently, the French domestic support is also bound up with pride that France 
can take the lead in defence of humanitarian principles. It helps that the operations have 
mostly been small-scale, usually involving a few thousand soldiers at most, with little 
risk of extensive French casualties (Bell 2014). Although, a primary actor, France is not 
the only member state that has operated outside the EU framework, examples to that 
end include, European states making contributions to missions in Afghanistan and in 
Iraq (Menon 2004: 228), unilateral French intervention in Cote d`Ivoire in 2003 
(Gegout 2010: 133) again in 2011 with support given to UN forces (Vines 2011: 55), 
the Franco-British led NATO mission Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 and 
the French led Operation Serval in Mali in 2013 (Watanabe 2013). Both situations 
required a rapid, short-notice response; in addition the former depended on the superior 
air-support and intelligence capabilities of the USA and the latter depended on French 
pre-positioned forces in the region to be successful. But the overall French political 
trend has been to develop and promote EU missions (ibid.), with other member states 
being less active in this regard. 
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In sum, European Union member states, driven by external events and internal political 
considerations, have decided to endow the Union with a security and defence function. 
The current institutional architecture and politico-legal structure is a result of interstate 
bargaining in a specific institutional setting that has set the parameters on the outcomes. 
With security and defence being strongly linked with sovereignty and national interest 
protection, integration has been a balancing act between delegating a sufficient degree 
of powers for the EU policy mechanism to be efficient and coherent vis-à-vis remaining 
in control of their own national policies, choices and decision-making. In this process 
France as a previous colonial power and a still influential member state has been the key 
actor and interested party. Since its power has declined and means have been 
constrained, but its ambitions have to a large degree remained, exemplified by it being 
one of the countries that most often uses force abroad, France has worked to upload its 
ideas and ambitions to the EU-level while maintaining an avenue for alternative courses 
of action. The need for unanimity and compromise within a heterogeneous grouping has 
set limits on its achievements. In operationalizing the ESDP/CSDP framework, France 
was one again the most consistent and insistent driver, initiating all of the EU missions 
in Africa – region that it has strong past and present links and interests - to date as well 
as carrying the largest share of the burden of the missions. Since states need the consent 
and participation of others, with Germany and the UK being the other key players in 
this field, convergence between them has been found by limiting the mandates of the 
missions, employing its conception of effective multilateralism by supporting the UN or 
with the suitable context surrounding the operation authorization process. This also 
covers the need to exhibit cooperation and unity to emphasising the humanitarian need 
or economic self-interest. Thus, a suitable context for a limited mandate with a unifying 
factor, a strong and interested lead state willing to cover most of the costs, low risk and 
collective gain for the EU is needed for the launching of a mission.   
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Kokkuvõte 
 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks oli analüüsida Euroopa Liidu sõjalisi missioone 
Aafrikas. Vaatluse all oli EL`i ühise välis-ja julgeolekupoliitika kujunemine lähtuvalt 
liberal intergovernmentalism´i teooriast ning Prantsuse liidriroll nii poliitika 
kujundamisel kui ka sõjaliste missioonide organiseerimisel ning läbiviimisel 2003. ja 
2006. aastal Kongo Demokraatlikus Vabariigis, 2008. aastal Tšaadis ja Kesk-Aafrika 
Vabariigis ning 2008. aastal piraaditõrjeoperatisoonil Somaalia rannikul. 
 
Magistritöö teoreetiliseks raamistikuks on Andrew Moravcsiku loodud liberal 
intergovernmentalism´i teooria. Teooria põhipostulaatideks on integratsioon kui kahe 
tasandi mängi, kus valitsused siseriiklikest piirangutest lähtuvalt moodustavad oma 
huvid, mis omakorda viiakse riikidevahelistesse läbirääkimistesse selleks, et 
maksimiseerida kasumit (nii materjaalset kui ka mittemateriaalset). Riikidevaheline 
tasand, seades omad piirangud võimalikele tulemitele, viib koostööni ning seeläbi 
integratsioonini. Protsessi juhivad riigid, lähtuvalt huvidest ning sisemisest survest 
(Moravcsik 1993). 
 
Kuna välis-ja julgeolekupoliitika on riikide suveräänsusega ning rahvuslike huvide 
kaitsega sügavalt seotud, siis seab see piiranguid võimalikule integratsioonile. Riigid on 
ühest küljest huvitatud kasu toovast koostööst, teisalt aga soovitakse omada võimalikult 
palju kontrolli protsessi üle, et vältida ettearvamatuid tagajärgi ning negatiivseid 
tulemeid. Kuni Maastricht`i lepinguni ei delegeerinud riigid välispoliitilisi kompetentse 
Euroopa Liidule, sealt maalt alates on aga EL`i ulatus antud sfääris kasvanud. Olles 
ajendatud Külma sõja lõpust, endise Jugoslaavia teritooriumil puhkenud konfliktidest ja 
neile reageerimise puudlikkusest, NATO ja Ameerika Ühendriikide huvi vähenemisest, 
julgeoleku ja ohu mõiste laienemisest ning kaitse-eelarvete vähendamisest Euroopas. 
Alates St Malo Prantsuse ja Suurbritannia kohtumisest 1998. aastal kui lepiti kokku 
Euroopa kaitse- ja julgeolekupoliitka loomine (ESDP), kuni Lissaboni leppeni kus ühine 
kaitse-ja julgeolekupoolitika (CSDP) saavutas oma tänase kuju on riigid poliitikat edasi 
arendanud, lisanud institutioone, ühise EL`i juhtimise ning peaeesmärke, samas pole 
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loobutud Nõukogu rollist ega ka mitte ühehäälsest hääletusest, lisaks on EL`i kesksed 
institustioonid jäänud sõltuvaks liikmseriikide poliitilisest tahtest ning nõusolekust, nii 
juhtivate inimeste ametisse määramisel kui ka nende töö suunamisel. Lisaks, on seatud 
sõjalisi eesmärke korduvalt vähendatud.  
 
Antud protsessi on iseloomustanud Prantsusmaa liidriroll, lähtuvalt oma siseriiklikest 
huvidest, sealhulgas soovides tugevdada oma positsiooni maailmas, olla sõltumatu 
Ameerika Ühendriikidest ja NATOst ning täiendada oma kaitse ja julgeoleku alaseid 
võimekusi. Kuna EL`i Nõukogu süsteemis, kuhu CSDP on liikmesriikide poolt 
paigutatud, ei ole võimalik üksinda otsuseid vastu võtta, siis on Prantsusmaa pidanud 
koostööd tegema teiste Euroopa sõjaliselt mõjukate suur-riikidega, ehk siis 
Suurbritannia või Saksamaaga, selleks et uuendusi vastu võtta ning poliitikat ellu viia. 
Lisaks, liikmesriikide hulgast lähtuvalt koosneb EL erinevatest vaatepunktidest, 
strateegilistest kultuuridest ning huvides. Seega on esialgseid ettepanekuid kohandatud 
kõigile sobivaimaks. Põhjamaade eestvedamisest tulenevalt lisati näiteks esialgsele 
Prantsuse-Suurbritannia sõjalisele ESDP`le ka tsiviilmissionid.  
 
Prantsusmaal on huvid ka jätkuva Aafrikas kohaloleku osas, olles endine koloniaalvõim 
kellel on säilinud tihedad poliitilised, majanduslikud ning kultuurilised sidemed 
regiooniga. Kuna Prantsusmaa Aafrika-poliitikat on iseloomustanud kohati vasutoluline 
sõjaline sekkumine, siis on üritatud viimastel aastakümenetel oma lähenemist 
legitimiseerida tegutsedes läbi rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide, ÜRO mandaadiga või 
humanitaar-kaalutustest lähtuval.  
 
Riikide loodud CSDP süsteem on võimaldanud läbi viia ligi 30 erinevat missioon. Neist 
valdav osa on olnud tsiviilmissionid koos kuue sõjalise missiooniga, millest neli on 
olnud Aafrikas. EL`i esimene autonoomne sõjaline mission Artemis toimus 2003. aastal 
Konogo DV`s, millele järgnes 2006. aasta EUFOR DRC samuti Kongos. EL`i suurim 
Aafrika missioon oli EUFOR Chad/CAR 2008. aastal Tšaadi ja Kesk-Aafrika Vabariiki 
ning ainus mereväe missioon on olnud piraaditõrje, Atalanta EU NAVFOR, Somaalia 
ranniku lähedal, mis algas 2008. aastal. Kõik neli missiooni on läbi viidud Prantsusmaa 
algatusel.  
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Põhjendused ja motivatisoonid missioonide läbi viimiseks, neis osalemiseks ning 
nendega nõustumiseks on muuhulgas olnud EL`i ühtsuse ja võimekuse 
demonstreerimine (Iraagi sõja vastuolude järgne Artemis), Prantsusmaa surveavaldus 
Saksamaale ning viimase soov panustada CSDP tugevdamisesse (EUFOR DRC), 
Darfuri kriisi mittesekkumisest tulenev tung olukorra lahendamiseks panustamisele 
(EUFOR Chad/CAR), ÜRO abipalvele vastamine (kõik kolm) ning majandushuvide 
kaitse (Atalanta). Nii Artemise kui ka Atalanta osas jõudis EL kollektiivina üsna kiiresti 
ühisele arvamusele, mõlemad EUFOR´id olid vastuolulisemad Prantsusmaa tugeva 
osaluse tõttu ning missoonide algus lükkus korduvalt edasi. Saksamaa ja Suurbritannia 
on mõlemad ühe missiooni eesotsas olnud, juhtudel kus Prantsusmaa on pidanud 
paremaks antud rollist loobuda, nii CSDP poliitilist tugevust silmas pidades kui ka enda 
piirangutest lähtuvalt.  
 
Läbivaks jooneks on olnud missioonide humanitaarkaalutustele rõhumine, samas on aga 
mandaadid olnud piiratud nii ajaliselt, piirkondlikult kui ka väegede suuruse osas, 
peamiselt raamistikku milles suudeti kokku leppida ja osalejaid nõusse saada, mitte 
reaalsest kriisisituatsiooni vajadusest lähtuvalt. Misioonid on olnud ka vägedele vähese 
riskiga. 
 
Kokkuvõtteks võib väita, et EL`i ühine kaitse- ja julgeolekupoliitka on tugevasti 
mõjutatud olnud liikmesriikide tahtest ja soovidest, kuna nad on protsess üle kontrolli 
oma valduses hoidnud. Integratsioon on sügavnenud juhtudel kui see on riikidele 
kasulik, on jäetud piisavalt variante alternatiivseteks lähenemisteks ja käitumiseks ning 
lõpptulemus on läbirääkimiste käigus erinevate vaadete ühildamine. Kõige suuremat ja 
läbivamat rolli, koostöös eri partneritega, on mänginud Prantsusmaa. Olles ka 
siseriikliklikest huvidest ning poliitilstest kaalutlustest lähtuvalt EL`i Aafrika 
missioonide eestvedaja ja neisse suurim panustaja. Selleks, et missioonid aga tervikule 
sobivad oleksid on nad olnud piiratud mandaadi, vähese riski ja vahendidtega, toimunud 
sobivas üldkontekstis ning panustanud EL`i poliitika üldarengusse ning tugevdamisesse. 
 
